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CaseNo.20100599-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Tamra Rhinehart, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioner Tamra Rhinehart appeals the district court's dismissal of her post-
conviction petition. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-
103(2)0) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue I: Did the trial court plainly err by not giving Rhinehart notice that the State's 
motion to dismiss would be converted into a summary judgment motion, where conversion 
was required because Rhinehart had asked the court to consider matters outside the 
pleadings? 
Standard of Review: Rhinehart invited the alleged error, so there is no review for 
plain error. See State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, If 9, 86 P.3d 742. 
Issue II: Did the trial court erroneously dismiss Rhinehart's petition on summary 
judgment, where Rhinehart did not proffer evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
material fact on any claim? 
Standard of Review. An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and 
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, If 6, 177 P.3d 600. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 are included in Addendum A of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE CASE 
Underlying Crime 
In July 2003, the body of Michael Boudrero was discovered in the basement of a 
home under construction in North Logan. State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^ 1, 3-9, 167 
P.3d 1046 (Addendum B). He had been shot twice—once in the chest and once in the back. 
Id. at Tf 1. Boudrero was Tamra Rhinehart's ex-husband. Id. 
Police soon learned that Rhinehart had incurred substantial debt following her divorce 
from Boudrero, and that for several months prior to the murder, Rhinehart had been trying to 
secure a life insurance policy on Boudrero that named Rhinehart as the beneficiary. Id. at 
Tf 5. Several insurance companies had rejected Rhinehart's attempts, but a "persistent Ms. 
Rhinehart finally succeeded in purchasing a $50,000 life insurance policy for Mr. Boudrero 
in April 2003 in which she listed herself as the beneficiary. Because the insurance company 
required Mr. Boudrero's signature prior to issuance, Ms. Rhinehart forged it." Id. 
2 
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Police also obtained sworn statements from several people implicating Rhinehart in 
the murder. These included her hairdresser (to whom she had confessed), her babysitter, and 
Boudrero and claimed that he had done so at Rhinehart's request Id. at ^ 4-6. 
Rhinehart pleads guilty to aggravated murder in exchange for the 
State dropping its request for the death penalty 
R hinehart was charged with one con: u it of aggi a\ ated mi lrder a capital felon} , c i: le 
count of forgery, and four counts of communications fraud. Id. at % 7. In a separate 
information, the State charged Rhinehart with one count of burglary, three counts of theft, 
and one count of communications fraud. Id. "The burgia;.* ;;.:u ag^vau-u mi::..jr ... . -. 
were ultimately severed, and Rhinehart was convicted in the burglary case, which proceeded 
first." Id at f 8. 
Several months after her conviction in the burglary case, Rhinehart accepted a plea 
agreement that resolved the aggravated mi it der case, Rhinehart pleaded i; ,?) T< ./. • • it 
of aggravated murder. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts, as well 
as "withdrawf ] its request to impose the death penalty." R, 116 [<hinehart further agreed to 
serve a prison sentence "of either life without possibility of parole, or an indeterminate 
prison term of not less than 20 years and which may be for life," to be determined by the 
judge. Id.1 IHJ \r:A court conducted a complete rule 11 colloquy before accepting 
-
;
*nvWtrf? nlea. See R 123-63 (transcript of plea hearing attached as Addendum D). 
The plea agreement from the underlying criminal case is included in the post-
conviction record at R. 112-20, and it is attached as Addendum C to this brief. 
3 
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At sentencing, Rhinehart was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of 
parole. See Addendum E (docket for criminal case 031100633 at *55-56). Mary Corporon 
represented Rhinehart throughout the trial-level proceedings. See generally R. 3-29. 
The supreme court rejects Rhinehart's direct appeal 
Rhinehart appealed through new counsel, arguing that Corporon was ineffective 
during the plea process, and that Corporon's "ineffectiveness... caused her to enter her plea 
and to fail to bring a timely motion to withdraw it." Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^ f 11. The 
supreme court rejected her appeal, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because of 
Rhinehart's failure to timely move to withdraw her plea. Id. at fflf 10-22. 
Rhinehart9s post-conviction petition 
Rhinehart filed a petition for post-conviction relief, again claiming that Corporon was 
ineffective. R. 3-29. Rhinehart alleged that Corporon was ineffective because she: 
(1) recommended that Rhinehart plead guilty, even though some evidence purportedly 
suggested that Rhinehart was innocent; (2) mistakenly advised Rhinehart that a judge would 
likely sentence her to life with the possibility of parole; (3) mistakenly advised Rhinehart 
about the nature of her post-plea appellate rights; (4) "coerced" Rhinehart into pleading 
guilty at the plea hearing by squeezing her shoulder; (5) did not prevent Rhinehart from 
pleading guilty, even though Rhinehart was allegedly depressed and anxious during the plea 
process; and (6) refused to file a motion to timely withdraw Rhinehart's guilty plea. R. 9-13. 
Rhinehart also alleged that her appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that, despite 
4 
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Rhinehart's failure to timely move to withdraw the plea, the plea could still be attacked on 
direct appeal under the misplea doctrine. R. 13-15. 
where she detailed the above claims (R. 18-20); (2) an affidavit from Corporon that 
Rhinehart was crying and distressed during the plea hearing (R. 22-23); (3) an affidavit from 
a reporter stating that Rhinehart appeared distressed during the plea hearing (R. 25-26); and 
(4) an affidavit from Scott Williams, Corporon's co-counsel, who said that he was surprised 
that Rhinehart accepted the plea offer because he was aware of some evidence suggesting 
that she was innocent (R. 28-29). 
A ft IT the State moves to dismiss Rhinehart's petition, Rhinehart submits se\ ei ill 
documents outside of the pleadings in support of her petition 
The State moved to dismiss Rhinehart's petition. R. 65-100. The State argued that 
Rhinehart had waived any claim . f innocence below, and that her pleadings were "not 
sufficient" to carry her burden on any of her remaining claims. R. " ; ' : - -0t'. lie State 
attached three exhibits in support of its motion: (1) the supreme court's opinion rejecting 
Rhinehart's appeal; (2) the plea statement Rhinehart signed before pleading guilty; and (3) a 
transcript of the plea hearing. K \ nl-63. In a si lpplemei itai i nemorandi tin that the State 
filed before Rhinehart responded, the State reiterated its claim that Rhinehart had "failed to 
allege facts sufficient to carry her burden under the PCRAz K. 188. 
Rhinehart filed a memoranda im in opposition to the State's motion to dismiss. R 1.90-
210, Rhinehart attached four new exhibits in support of her memorandum in opposition. 
5 
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First, Rhinehart attached a newspaper article from a local newspaper that contained a 
photograph of Rhinehart and Corporon at the plea hearing. R. 199 (attached as Addendum 
F). Rhinehart argued that this photograph supported her claim that Corporon coerced her 
into pleading guilty because it showed that Corporon's hand was "on [her] shoulder" and 
"Corporon's face [was] frowning and very stern." R. 193. 
Second, Rhinehart attached the signature pages from her plea affidavit and her post-
conviction petition. R. 201-02. Rhinehart argued that comparing the two signatures 
supported her coercion claim, because the way she signed the plea affidavit made it 
"appearf ]" that she was "struggling," while her "signature on the [post-conviction] petition 
is very neatly written and conveys an upbeat attitude." R. 193, 
Third, Rhinehart attached an article from the Deseret News regarding the delays in 
Utah's death penalty system. R. 204-05. In that article, the Utah Attorney General's 
spokesperson had "wryly" suggested that "no one gets executed unless they volunteer for it," 
and that Utah's death penalty has become a "legal fiction." R. 204. Rhinehart argued that 
this supported her claim that Corporon was ineffective for advising her to take the deal in 
order to avoid the death penalty because it showed that "there actually was really little 
chance at all that Rhinehart would receive the death sentence here in Utah." R. 195. 
Finally, Rhinehart attached several pages of what appeared to be anonymous internet 
commentary about the possible effects of Lexapro, an antidepressant medication. R. 207-09. 
2
 In June 2010 (seven months after Rhinehart filed her memorandum in opposition in 
this case), the State of Utah executed Ronnie Lee Gardner by firing squad. Gardner did not 
volunteer for execution. 
6 
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Without any evidentiary support linking these alleged effects to her own case, Rhinehart 
argued that this supported her claim that her plea was involuntary because she was taking 
Lexapi o at the time of the plea R 195. ' • ' • 
The State filed a reply to Rhinehart's memorandum. R. 217-25. Addressing 
Rhinehart's coercion claim, the State argued that for purposes of this motion, it did "not 
dispute that Corporon pi it her hand on Rhinehart's shoulder, noi does it dispute that 
Rhinehart was emotional during the plea hearing." R. 222. But the State nevertheless 
argued that "regardless of whether" these facts were true, Rhinehart had not proven coercion 
under the applicable standard. R. 222-23. 
The district court dismisses Rhineharrs ignition 
The district court subsequently held a hearing on the State's motion. At the outset of 
the hearing, the district court expressed its understanding "that this is essentially a 12(b)(6) 
review hear in i; tn SOL1 if the pleadiims arc sufficient t;ikin:: nenthiru that ihc petitions is 
saying as true." R. 271: 6. State's counsel responded that because the parties had "referred 
to matters outside the pleadings," its motion to dismiss should actually be treated as a 
summary judgment motion. R 2 71: 6 7. 1 1 le c ourt respoi ided: "I'm fine with that. "I he 
standard's the same." Id. Rhinehart did not object to this, nor did she ask for time to present 
additional evidence. See generally R. 271: 1-37. 
The State then argued that summary judgment was appropriate on each of Rhinehart's 
claims. The State argued that while it "obviously disagree[d] factually with some of the 
claims that Ms. Rhinehart has raised," "given the posture at which we're here today . . . it's 
7 
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the State's position that even if her allegations are true, she still has not shown that she's 
entitled to relief." R. 271: 7; see also R. 271: 10-19. 
The post-conviction court subsequently issued a ruling dismissing Rhinehart's 
petition. R. 233-37 (Addendum G). According to the court, dismissal was warranted 
because Rhinehart had "failed to provide any evidence that would objectively demonstrate 
that her counsel's representation was unreasonable." R. 234. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Rhinehart argues that the trial court improperly converted the State's motion 
to dismiss into a summary judgment motion because it did not give her reasonable notice of 
the conversion or an opportunity to present evidence. But conversion was required because 
the court considered documents outside the pleadings that Rhinehart had submitted. Given 
this, invited error bars Rhinehart's claim that she was not given proper notice. 
In any event, this claim fails on its merits. Rhinehart submitted materials that were 
outside the pleadings. When she submitted those materials, the rule required the court to 
treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Her own actions and the 
plain language of the governing rule notified her that the motion to dismiss would be treated 
as a summary judgment motion. This claim accordingly fails. 
Point II: Rhinehart next argues that the trial court improperly granted summary 
judgment. She has inadequately briefed that claim. Rhinehart makes no effort to delineate 
her distinct legal claims from each other and has not cited to the record for the majority of 
them. Even if the merits are reached, however, this claim fails because Rhinehart has not 
8 
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produced evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact with respect to any issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR WHEN IT 
CONVERTED THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS TO A 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION , 
Rhinehart first argues that the district court plainly erred by improperly converting the 
State's motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion. See Pet. Br. !*-20. According 
to R hinehart, the district court ob\ iousl> and preji idiciall)- err - *• . - A.J, M 
reasonable notice of the potential conversion, as well as by denying her the opportunity to 
gather evidence in opposition to a summary judgment motion. 
/i • , ho wev er, Rhinehai t in\ ited any en 01 v;,v It'll respect to the 
conversion by submitting materials that were outside the pleadings in her opposition to the 
State's motion. She therefore cannot obtain relief for plain error. But even if reached, this 
claim still fails because Rhinehart was given ample notice of the conversion, as well as a 
reasonable opportunity to gather evidence. 
A. Background law. 
' L;.V !l\h"6), Utah Rules of Civil I Procedure, allow s a district court: to dismiss a 
complaint when the plaintiff has "failfed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 
A rule 12(b)(6) motion "concerns the sufficiency of the pleadings, not the underlying merits 
( >f a particular case." Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 ! J" I \pp 10, \ 1 • I , 1 55 P.3d 893 (quotations and 
citation omitted). A court can also dismiss a complaint on summary judgment. Unlike a rule 
12(b)(6) motion, summary judgment looks beyond the pleadings. The question is whether 
9 
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the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits,. . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). 
If a defendant files a 12(b)(6) motion but "matters outside the pleading" are 
"presented to and not excluded by the court," the district court is required to convert the 
motion to summary judgment motion. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 12(b); see also Strand v. 
Associated Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1977) (holding that if 
the court relies on matters outside the pleadings, conversion is "mandatory"); Herbertson v. 
WillowcreekPlaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 n.2 (Utah 1996); Tuttle, 2007 UT App 10, ] 8. 
If a district court considers matters outside the pleadings, thereby triggering 
conversion, the court is required to give the parties a "reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Utah R. Civ. Proc. 12(b); see also 
Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 (requiring "adequate notice" and an "opportunity to submit 
supporting materials"); Tuttle, 2007 UT App 10, f 8 (requiring "reasonable notice" and an 
opportunity to submit additional materials). 
On appeal from such a ruling, "labels do not control." Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 n.l 
(quotations and citation omitted). Thus, if a district court, "in effect, properly treats . . . a 
rule 12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment but erroneously characterize^] its action 
as a ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the ruling will be reviewed as if 
10 
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it had been a ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Id, (quotations and citation 
omitted); accord Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). 
B. There was no plain error with respect to the court's decision to convert 
the State's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment 
1. This claim is barred by the invited error doctrine. 
As noted, Rhinehart first claims that the court improperly converted the motion to 
dismiss into a summary judgment motion. Pet. Br. 15-20. Rhinehart acknowledges that this 
claim was unpreserved, but nevertheless argues that the district court plainly erred by not 
giving her proper notice or an opportunity to submit opposing materials. Id. This claim 
should not be reached, however, because it is barred by the invited error doctrine.3 
Under the invited error doctrine, "a party on appeal cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." State v. 
Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f 26, 153 P.3d 804 (quotations and citation omitted); see also 
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989). This applies when "counsel, either by 
statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection" to the 
challenged action. State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, ^ f 11, 236 P.3d 155 (quotations and 
citation omitted). A part}/ who invites error cannot obtain appellate review for plain error or 
3
 In her brief, Rhinehart initially claims that "the record is unclear" about whether the 
court actually converted the State's motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion. Pet. 
Br. 17. During the hearing below, however, the court agreed with the State's suggestion that 
because the parties had "referred to matters outside the pleadings,... we're at [the] summary 
judgment stage rather than 12(b)(6) stage." R. 271: 7. Based on that ruling, the State then 
repeatedly invoked the summary judgment standard. R. 271: 7, 10, 14, 16, 18-19. And the 
court then relied on matters outside the pleadings in its ruling. R. 217: 12-13; 234-35. 
But in any event, if Rhinehart is correct that the motion did not convert, this would 
erase the predicate for her improper conversion claim, and it would fail for that reason alone. 
11 
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exceptional circumstances. See State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, \ 9, 86 P.3d 742; 
Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511,126. 
In her response to the State's motion to dismiss, Rhinehart asked the district court to 
consider several items that were outside the pleadings—including a photograph from the 
Logan Daily Herald, an article from the Deseret News, and several unidentified pages of 
anonymous internet commentary. R. 190-210. When the State argued at the hearing that 
these materials required conversion to summary judgment, Rhinehart did not object, nor did 
she ask for time to present additional evidence. See generally R. 271: 7. The district court 
accordingly considered Rhinehart's evidence regarding Utah's death penalty system at the 
motion hearing, expressly referred to the Logan Daily Herald photograph in its written 
ruling, and appears to have considered the internet evidence as well, R. 217: 12-13; 234-35. 
In short, conversion was required because the district court accepted Rhinehart's 
invitation to consider extra-record materials as a basis for denying the State's motion to 
dismiss. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). By submitting such materials to the court, Rhinehart 
"led the trial court" into converting the motion. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, If 26. Invited 
error bars this plain error claim, and it should not be considered. 
2. If reached, this claim fails because Rhinehart was given reasonable 
notice and an opportunity to respond. 
As noted, Rhinehart argues that the court plainly erred by converting the motion to 
dismiss to a summary judgment motion. Pet. Br. 20. "[T]o establish the existence of plain 
error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, 
the appellant must show the following: (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
12 
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obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). Rhinehart's plain error claim fails for two reasons. 
First, she has not shown that the court committed any obvious error. Trial courts are 
required to give the parties "reasonable notice" and an "opportunity to submit all pertinent 
summary judgment materials" before converting a motion to dismiss into a summary 
judgment motion. Turtle, 2007 UT App 10, ^  8. The trial court did not obviously violate 
either prong of this here. 
Rhinehart had reasonable notice that conversion would occur when she filed a 
memorandum affirmatively asking the court to consider matters outside the pleadings. She 
also had notice that these matters might be at issue when the State filed a reply memorandum 
arguing that, even if this evidence was true, it was still insufficient. Finally, Rhinehart was 
given express notice of conversion at the hearing when the court agreed with the State that 
conversion was required. R. 271: 7. Despite this, Rhinehart did not ever ask the court to 
postpone its consideration of the State's motion, nor did she ever argue that she had had too 
little time to effectively respond. In fact, she did not argue that a conversion had not taken 
place. By her silence, she effectively acknowledged that she knew it had. 
Rhinehart was also given "an adequate opportunity to rebut matters outside the 
pleadings." Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, f 4, 987 P.2d 36; see also Utah R. Civ. Proc, 
12(b). The State filed its motion to dismiss on March 3,2009. R.65. On October 19,2009, 
Rhinehart filed her response, accompanied by several matters outside the pleadings. R. 190. 
13 
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The trial court held oral arguments on the State's motion on March 31, 2010. R. 190, 232-
33. If Rhinehart believed that she did not have enough time to gather rebuttal materials 
during the 12 months between the State's motion and the hearing, she should have filed a 
motion asking for more time, or instead to allow supplemental briefing. She did not. Given 
this, and given her own role in initiating the conversion, she cannot claim that she did not 
have adequate time. There was no obvious error. 
Second, Rhinehart also has not shown that this alleged error was "harmful." Though 
she complains about the alleged lack of notice and opportunity to present evidence, she has 
not identified what other evidence she would have gathered with more time, nor has she 
articulated how this additional evidence would have defeated a summary judgment motion. 
She has therefore failed to allege, let alone establish, that the allegedly improper conversion 
prejudiced her. This claim accordingly fails. 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PETITION 
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Rhinehart next argues that the district court "erred in dismissing the petition on 
summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material facts." Pet. Br. at 21-25. 
This claim is inadequately briefed and should not be considered. But even if considered, it 
should be rejected because there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to any 
of Rhinehart's claims. 
A. This claim is inadequately briefed, 
A party is required to set forth the "contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the 
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issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial 
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9). This Court has repeatedly held that a claim is inadequately briefed if a 
party4oes not cite to and analyze the record in conjunction with each claim. See, e.g., State 
v. Bhagh Singh, 2011 UT App 396,14,267 P.3d 2%\\Morfordv. DCFS, 2010 UT App 285, 
ffif 7-8, 241 P.3d 1213; State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185,1 47, 236 P.3d 161. 
Rhinehart alleged ineffectiveness of both trial and appellate counsel. R. 3-29. Her 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim faults counsel for: (1) recommending that 
Rhinehart plead guilty, even though some favorable evidence existed that Rhinehart could 
have used if she had gone to trial; (2) allegedly advising Rhinehart that a judge would likely 
sentence her to life with the possibility of parole; (3) allegedly misadvising Rhinehart about 
the nature of her post-plea appellate rights; (4) allegedly "coercing" Rhinehart into pleading 
guilty at the plea hearing by squeezing on her shoulder; (5) alleging advising Rhinehart to 
plead guilty, even though Rhinehart was depressed and anxious during the plea process; and 
(6) refusing to file a motion to timely withdraw her guilty plea. R. 9-13. Rhinehart also 
alleged that her appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that her plea should have 
been vacated under the misplea doctrine. R. 13-15. 
Despite the wide array of claims, Rhinehart's brief fails to distinguish between them 
in any meaningful way. See generally Pet. Br. 21-25. For example, Rhinehart lumps all of 
her ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims together into a single conclusory analysis, 
Pet. Br. 23-24, even though they involve a wide array of facts and different legal standards. 
15 
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Rhinehart also fails to properly support her claims with citation to the record. In fact, 
Rhinehart's entire argument about these seven different ineffective assistance arguments 
contains only two record citations, Pet. Br. 24, and Rhinehart makes no effort to delineate 
which evidence created which genuine issue of fact with respect to which issue. 
Strickland requires more. With respect to deficient performance, for example, 
Rhinehart must identify the specific acts or omissions she alleges did not result from 
reasonable professional judgment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688,690(1984). So, 
too, with respect to prejudice. As with deficient performance, Rhinehart must articulate, 
with specificity, how it is that she thinks the result would have been different but for the 
individually identified errors. See Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). 
"[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel" therefore "cannot be a speculative matter[,] but 
must be a demonstrable reality." Id. 
Rhinehart's inadequate briefing has forced the State, and ultimately this Court, to 
review the record for her to determine what evidence (if any) supported each of her seven 
separate claims, as well as determine what legal standards apply to them, and how those 
standards and facts work together in the summary judgment/post-conviction context. 
As has been noted "many times before, 'this court is not a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Green, 2004 UT 
76, % 13, 99 P.3d 820. Utah's appellate rules therefore require "not just bald citation to 
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). 
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Rhinehart has wholly failed to do this here. Given this failure, this claim is 
inadequately briefed and should not be addressed. 
B. There were no genuine issues of material fact, and the State was 
entitled to relief as a matter of law on all claims. 
Even if this Court reaches the merits, it should affirm because Rhinehart has not 
shown that there were any genuine issues of material fact.4 
1. Background law. 
Summary Judgment: A district court must grant summary judgment if "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). A court does not weigh the credibility of the 
evidence when reviewing such a motion, but instead draws all reasonable inferences in 
support of the nonmoving party. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 
1292 (Utah App. 1996). Summary judgment serves a "salutary purpose in our procedure 
because it eliminates the time, trouble and expense of a trial, when, upon the best showing 
the plaintiff can possibly make, he would not be entitled to a judgment." Brandt v. 
Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1960); accordAmjacs Intenvest, Inc. v. 
Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1981). 
A plaintiff cannot defeat a summary judgment motion by pointing to any question of 
fact. Rather, a dispute of fact must be "genuine" to preclude relief. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). 
4
 The following analysis is more detailed than the district court's. But it is settled that 
a summary judgment ruling "may be affirmed on any ground available to the trial court, even 
if it is one not relied on below." Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.9 2003 UT 23, 
142, 70 P.3d 904 (quotations and citation omitted). 
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The "word 'genuine'" in this context "indicates that a district court is not required to draw 
every possible inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, in favor of the 
nonmoving party." IHCHealth Sews., Inc.v. D&KMgm% 7/7C.,2008UT73,Tf 19,196P.3d 
588. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate unless there are "reasonable inferences" from 
the evidence that preclude dismissal. Id. (emphasis in original). 
A genuine dispute of fact must also be "material to the applicable rule of law" to 
defeat a summary judgment motion. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). 
The "mere existence of genuine issues of fact in the case as a whole does not preclude the 
entry of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution of the case." Horgan 
v. Indus. Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982). 
Moreover, while a single affidavit alone may be sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact, this does not mean that merely submitting an affidavit always defeats a 
summary judgment motion. For example, vague or "conclusory" factual statements in 
affidavits are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Norton, 669 P.2d at 
859. Instead, to defeat summary judgment, an affidavit must allege "specific facts" that are 
admissible as evidence. See Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. v. Wellsville, 2000UT81,^J24,13 P.3d 
5 81 ("Bald statements do not suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact."); Williams 
v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985) ("An affidavit which merely reflects the affiant's 
unsubstantiated conclusions and which fails to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create 
an issue of fact."); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) ("To raise a genuine 
issue of fact, an affidavit must do more than reflect the affiant's opinions and conclusions."); 
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Norton, 669 P.2d at 859 (Utah 1983). Similarly, a plaintiff also cannot defeat a summary 
judgment motion by expressing legal conclusions in an affidavit. See Capital Assets Fin. 
Servs., v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah App. 1998) (a trial court "must disregard" 
legal conclusions in such an affidavit). 
Ineffective Assistance: To establish ineffective assistance, Rhinehart must satisfy 
Strickland's two-part test. If she fails to prove either part, her claim fails. See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 697; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 (Utah 1994). 
First, Rhinehart must show that her counsel's performance was deficient by 
identifying specific acts or omissions that fall outside reasonable professional judgment. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88,690. An appellate court "must indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that 
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. at 689 (citation omitted). 
Second, Rhinehart must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694; 
see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f^ 19, 12 P.3d 92. "A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. It is not enough to show that 
the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Counsel's errors 
must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787-88 (2011) (quotations and citation omitted). 
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The ultimate burden in summary judgment litigation remains with the party who bears 
the ultimate burden at trial. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^  10, 177 P.3d 600. In post-
conviction, that is Rhinehart. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-105(1) (West 2009). Thus, to 
avoid summary judgment on her ineffective assistance claims, Rhinehart must set forth 
specific facts showing that there "is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each 
prong of the Strickland test." Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ffi[ 42-43, 267 P.3d 232. 
An affidavit that simply alleges that she was prejudiced does not suffice. See id. at *[fl[ 52-55. 
2. The State was entitled to relief as a matter of law on Rhinehart5 s claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for recommending that she plead 
guilty, even though some favorable evidence existed. 
Rhinehart first claims that Corporon was ineffective for recommending that she plead 
guilty, even though some favorable evidence existed that could have been used at a trial. R. 
11-13. Though unclear in her brief, Rhinehart's underlying legal argument seems to be that 
if there is any evidence from which a jury could find a defendant not guilty, defense counsel 
violates the Constitution by recommending that the defendant accept a plea deal from the 
State, rather than going to trial. See generally id. 
From the State's review of the record, these facts supported this claim: (1) Rhinehart's 
affidavit claiming that she was innocent and that she would not have pleaded guilty but for 
Corporon's advice (R. 18-20), and (2) the affidavit from Scott Williams, Corporon's co-
counsel, claiming that Craig Nicholls told him that Rhinehart "did not help him commit any 
crime and did not ask him to commit any crime." (R. 28-29). Even if these allegations were 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
true, however, the State was still entitled to relief as a matter of law because Rhinehart's 
alleged facts do not establish deficient performance or prejudice. 
Deficient Performance: To show deficient performance under Strickland, Rhinehart 
must show that her counsel's conduct was "objectively unreasonable," State v. King, 2008 
UT 54, % 18,190 P.3d 1283. Rhinehart must overcome a "strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, [she] must 
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be 
considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation omitted). Because 
Rhinehart bears this burden, she is entitled to relief only if she "persuad[es] the court that 
there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, 
% 6, 89 P.3d 162 (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation omitted). If she does not do 
this, her deficient performance claim fails as a matter of law. See id. at f 7; State v. Holbert, 
2002 UTApp 426,f 58,61 P.3d 291. 
It is well settled that defense counsel may strategically recommend that a defendant 
take a plea in order to minimize a possible sentence that would follow a conviction—even 
where some evidence exists that is favorable to the defendant. In Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 
1029,103 8 (Utah 1989), the supreme court recognized that a defendant may "lawfully plead 
guilty to a crime he factually did not commit to avoid risking conviction on another more 
serious charge," or instead "in exchange for a lesser sentence." This is particularly true when 
the State is seeking the death penalty. See, e.g., Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, fflf 37-38, 
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203 P.3d 976; Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, \ 21, 94 P.3d 211; State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 
293, 297-98 (Utah 1992). 
Here, even if Corporon knew that Rhinehart claimed that she was innocent, and even 
if Corporon also knew that Nicholls,had told Corporon's co-counsel that Rhinehart was 
innocent, Corporon's advice that Rhinehart should plead guilty anyway was not 
constitutionally deficient. The reason is that Corporon also knew about the compelling 
evidence the State had showing that Rhinehart was guilty. This included proof that Rhinehart 
had spent several months trying to obtain a life insurance policy on her ex-husband, that she 
had forged his name in at least one attempt, that these efforts were motivated by Rhinehart's 
demonstrable financial need, that Rhinehart's new boyfriend, Craig Nicholls, had murdered 
her ex-husband shortly after she succeeded in finally obtaining a life insurance policy on 
him, an earlier sworn statement to police from Nicholls directly implicating Rhinehart in the 
murder, and testimony from several others witnesses claiming that Rhinehart had confessed 
to them after the murder. See generally Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^ 3-6. 
When determining how to advise Rhinehart, Corporon had to consider both the 
inculpatory facts and the exculpatory facts. This is therefore not a case in which there was 
unassailable, incontrovertible evidence affirmatively proving that a defendant was innocent, 
no compelling evidence suggesting otherwise, but the defense attorney advised the defendant 
to plead guilty anyway. Rather, this was a case in which there was strong, admissible 
evidence from which the State could prove to a jury that Rhinehart was guilty—as well as 
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some weaker evidence suggesting that she was not, and where defense counsel then made an 
informed recommendation based on the totality of the evidentiary picture. 
In short, given that the State had a strong case against Rhinehart for capital murder, 
the Constitution did not mandate that Corporon advise Rhinehart go to trial and face possible,^^^,, 
execution. Even if Rhinehart's factual claims are correct, Corporon's advice was not 
constitutionally deficient. She therefore has not shown deficient performance.5 
Prejudice: As noted, Rhinehart must also demonstrate "that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. To prove this 
regarding her counsel's advice to plead guilty, Rhinehart must also "convince the court that a 
decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." 
Padillav. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473,1485 (2010). Thus, Rhinehart must not only prove that 
the deficient performance led to her plea, but that without it, it would have been rational for 
her to have gone to trial and risked a possible death sentence. A "mere allegation that she 
would have insisted on trial . . . is ultimately insufficient" to prove this. United States v. 
Clingman, 288 F.3d 1183,1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotations and citation omitted). Instead, 
courts "will often review the strength of the prosecutor's case as the best evidence of whether 
5
 Additionally, nothing in this record establishes that Corporon even knew about 
Williams' conversations with Nicholls. In Williams' affidavit, he says that he had the 
conversations with Nicholls, and that he was then absent from this case during the period in 
which Rhinehart pleaded; notably, Williams says nothing about ever relaying the 
conversations with Nicholls to Corporon. R. 28-29. Moreover, neither Rhinehart nor 
Corporon's affidavits make any mention of Corporon being informed of these conversations. 
SeeR. 18-20,22-23. 
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a defendant in fact would have changed [her] plea and insisted on going to trial." Miller v. 
Champion, 262 F.3d 1066,1072 (10th Cir. 2001); see also State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,f86, 
152 P.3d 321 ("[I]n determining the effect of the error, we 'consider the totality of the 
evidence."). 
In the context of this particular claim, Rhinehart can therefore prevail only by proving 
that it would have been rational for her to choose to ignore Corporon's advice and proceed to 
trial, simply because: (1) she was willing to testify that she was innocent, and (2) Nicholls, 
her co-conspirator, had told one of her lawyers that she was not involved in the crime. 
But Rhinehart's credibility before the jury would have been in serious doubt. By the 
time of this trial, she had already been convicted of burglary, an admissible crime of 
dishonesty. See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, <fl 7. And by the time she testified, the State would 
also have put on evidence establishing, among others, that Rhinehart had forged her ex-
husband's name in an attempt to financially benefit from his death, that her ex-husband had 
been killed by her boyfriend, and that she had told several people that she was involved. 
Nicholls' statements would have been similarly impeachable. By the time he even 
could have testified in Rhinehart's trial, Nicholls was already a confessed murderer. 
Moreover, he had earlier told police that Rhinehart had been involved in the plot to kill her 
ex-husband. Thus, had he testified in this manner, the State could have impeached him with 
his own earlier statements. 
In short, the State could have proven its case with testimony from multiple witnesses 
who were not confessed murderers and had no apparent financial or self-interested motive to 
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lie, documentary proof establishing Rhinehart's motive in this case and willingness to lie, 
and earlier confessions from both Rhinehart and her co-conspirator. Rhinehart, on the other 
hand, would have apparently offered potential testimony from herself and her boyfriend, a 
confessed murderer. 
Under these circumstances, it would not have been rational for Rhinehart to have 
rejected this deal—thereby exposing herself to possible execution—based simply on the 
existence of this weak evidence. Like her deficient performance claim, her prejudice claim 
also fails as a matter of law. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate on both fronts. 
3. The State was entitled to relief as a matter of law on Rhinehart's claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for misadvising her about the 
sentence she would receive. 
Rhinehart next claims that Corporon was ineffective for making an incorrect pre-plea 
prediction about the sentence she would receive if she took this plea deal. R. at 11. From 
the State's review, these alleged facts supported this claim: (1) Rhinehart's affidavit alleging 
that "Corporon told me the jury would likely give me a sentence of life without parole, but 
that if I pled, the judge would definitely give me a sentence with the possibility [of] parole, 
and I believed her" (R. 19); and (2) an article from the Deseret News discussing the general 
delays in Utah's death penalty system (R. 204-05). Even if these facts are true, however, the 
State was still entitled to relief on this claim as a matter of law. 
First, Rhinehart's alleged facts fail as a matter of law to establish deficient 
performance. As noted, Rhinehart must show that her counsel's conduct was "objectively 
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unreasonable," King, 2008 UT 54, ^ 18, i.e. that it fell outside "the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
The reasonableness of an attorney's decision is assessed by what counsel knew at the 
time of the decision in question, not by what counsel subsequently learned. Harrington, 131 
S.Ct. at 789. Reliance on the "harsh light of hindsight to cast doubt on a trial that took place 
[earlier] is precisely what Strickland . . . seek[s] to prevent." Id. (quotations and citation 
omitted). An "ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim cannot survive so long as the decisions 
of a defendant's trial counsel were reasonable, even if mistaken." Campbell v. Coyle, 260 
F.3d 531, 551 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus, even if an informed decision ultimately proved to be 
incorrect, this "shows merely that the defense strategy did not work out as well as counsel 
had hoped, not that counsel was incompetent." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 790. 
Here, Rhinehart points to nothing more than a good faith prediction that ultimately 
proved to be mistaken. Predictions like this one that later prove to be incorrect do not offend 
the Constitution. This deficient performance therefore fails as a matter of law, and dismissal 
was appropriate for this reason alone. 
Second, Rhinehart's prejudice claim also fails as a matter of law. As noted, Rhinehart 
must demonstrate "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. And to prove this in the context of counsel's 
advice to plead guilty, Rhinehart must also "convince the court that a decision to reject the 
plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1485. 
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On this record, Rhinehart cannot prove that she would not have taken this plea 
agreement if she had been correctly informed that life without parole was still a valid 
sentencing option. The reason is that the unrebutted criminal record already shows that 
Rhinehart was willing to plead guilty even after being repeatedly informed of this. 
In the written plea agreement, which Rhinehart reviewed and signed in open court (R. 
154-55), Rhinehart acknowledged that she would be imprisoned for "either life without 
possibility of parole, or an indeterminate prison term of not less than 20 years and which 
may be for life, to be determined by the assigned judge herein, at an evidentiary sentencing 
hearing." R. at 116 (emphasis added). Rhinehart further acknowledged that while she could 
"produce testimony and evidence in support of a sentence of life," the State would be 
affirmatively asking the court to impose the harshest sentence by "producing] testimony and 
evidence in support of a sentence of life without possibility of parole." Id, 
This possibility was also discussed at the plea hearing before the judge accepted 
Rhinehart's plea. Early in that hearing, the judge informed Rhinehart that the "possible 
penalties that attach to the offense are death, life in prison without parole, or an 
indeterminate prison term of not less than 20 years and which may be for life." R. 132 
(emphasis added). Rhinehart personally acknowledged these "possible penalties," and 
further acknowledged that the plea only removed death as a possible sentence. Id. 
Later on in the hearing, the court again advised her that she faced the possibility of 
life without parole if she pleaded guilty. R. 142. The court explained that both sides would 
have the opportunity to present evidence at sentencing, and that the court would ultimately 
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decide whether she would, or would not, receive the possibility of parole. R. 142-43. 
Rhinehart specifically acknowledged that she might receive a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole. R. 143. It was only after this that she pleaded guilty. Given that 
Rhinehart was repeatedly,- unequivocally informed that life without parole was still an 
option, and even that the State would be pushing for it, and yet she still chose to plead, she 
has not shown that she would not have pleaded but for Corporon's alleged misadvice. 
Moreover, as discussed above, Rhinehart also must prove that it would have been 
rational to have rejected the deal on this basis—in other words, that it would have been 
rational for her to have rejected the deal if Corporon had only given her a more correct 
prediction. But the State had overwhelming evidence suggesting that Rhinehart arranged to 
have her ex-husband killed for her own financial gain. Rhinehart has pointed to little 
credible evidence suggesting otherwise. Had the jury convicted her, Rhinehart could have 
been executed. Under these circumstances, it would not have been rational for her to have 
rejected the deal on this narrow basis. This claim accordingly fails as a matter of law. 
4. The State was entitled to relief as a matter of law on Rhinehart's claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for misadvising her about her 
appellate rights. 
Rhinehart next claims that Corporon was ineffective for giving her bad pre-plea 
advice about her appellate rights. R. at 11. From the State's review, Rhinehart's sole factual 
support for this claim is her own affidavit, where she alleges that "Corporon did not explain 
to me that I was giving up most of my appeal rights by pleading guilty, and I did not 
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understand that I was." R. 19. But even if this is true, her claim still fails as a matter of law 
for two reasons. 
First, Rhinehart's affidavit does not create a "genuine" issue of fact on this basis. See 
IHCHealth Segys,, Inc., 2008 UT 73, \ 19 ("a district court is not required to dravvygvery 
possible inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, in favor of the nonmoving 
party," but instead only draws "reasonable inferences" from the evidence). In the summary 
judgment context, Utah courts "disregard" claims made in an affidavit if the claims 
contradict the affiant's earlier sworn testimony, unless the affiant "can provide an 
explanation of the discrepancy." Floyd v. Western Surgical Assocs., Inc., 773 P.2d 401,403 
(Utah App. 1989); Webster, 675 P.2d at 1172-73. A "contrary rule would undermine the 
utility of summary judgment as a means for screening out sham issues of fact." Webster, 675 
P.2dat l l73. 
Here, Rhinehart's claim that she was never informed of the limited nature of a post-
plea appeal is specifically contradicted by her own earlier sworn statements. In her plea 
statement, which Rhinehart signed under oath in open court, Rhinehart said that she had 
"discussed this case and this plea with [her] lawyers as much as [she] wish[ed] to," and that 
her decision to "enter this plea was made after full and careful thought, with the advice of 
counsel, [and] with a full understanding of [her] constitutional, trial, and appeal rights" R. 
117 (emphases added). She also acknowledged under oath that she knew that if she were 
"convicted" by a jury, she could "appeal," and that she was "freely, voluntarily, and 
knowingly waiving" that right. R. 114. 
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The trial court also placed Rhinehart under oath at the outset of the plea hearing. See 
R. 125. During the ensuing colloquy, Rhinehart acknowledged that if she pleaded guilty, she 
could no longer "contest [her] own statement of guilt on appeal," and she would instead 
retain only the limited right to appeal certain aspects of her sentence. R. 141, 149-50. 
When a defendant pleads guilty, she "must be bound to the answers [s]he provide[d] 
during aplea colloquy." Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560,566 (6th Cir. 1999); accord Barker 
v. United States, 7 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1993). Given that Rhinehart's affidavit 
contradicts her own sworn statements, this Court should "disregard the affidavit," Floyd, 
773 P.2d at 403, and instead conclude that Rhinehart has raised no genuine issue of material 
fact on this issue. 
Second, even if Rhinehart's affidavit is not disregarded, Rhinehart's ineffective 
assistance claim still fails as a matter of law because these facts do not show prejudice. 
As discussed above, a petitioner who alleges ineffective assistance must demonstrate 
the result below would have been different but for the alleged error. Here, though, even if it 
were true that Corporon misadvised Rhinehart before the plea about her appellate rights, this 
alleged error was cured at the plea hearing when Rhinehart repeatedly acknowledged under 
oath that she understood that she was waiving these very rights. R. 114-17, 149-50. 
Thus, the undisputed facts show that correct advice from Corporon on this issue 
would not have mattered, because Rhinehart still chose to plead guilty even after being 
expressly informed of these very rights in open court. The State was therefore entitled to 
relief as a matter of law on this postconviction claim. 
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5. Rhinehart proffered insufficient evidence to prove that Corporon 
"coerced" her into pleading guilty. 
Rhinehart's next claim was that at the plea hearing, Corporon physically "coerced" 
her into pleading guilty. R. 11-13. From the State's review, these alleged facts supported 
this claim: (1) Rhinehart's affidavit, where she said that Corporon "pressed firmly on my 
shoulder during most of the plea hearing, intimidating me" (R. 19); (2) a photo from a local 
newspaper of Rhinehart and Corporon at the hearing (R. 199); and (3) the signature pages 
from her plea affidavit and her post-conviction petition (R. 201-02).6 
Even accepting Rhinehart's allegations as true, this claim still fails as a matter of law 
because Rhinehart's proffered facts establish neither deficient performance nor prejudice. 
Deficient performance: Rhinehart's proffered facts are insufficient to show that 
Corporon did anything coercive. Coercion occurs when there is "compulsion by physical 
force or threat of physical force" that make an act involuntary. Black's Law Dictionary, 
Coercion (9th ed. 2009). For example, a contract is considered to have been coerced when 
there was a "wrongful act or threat which actually puts the victim in such fear as to compel 
him to act against his will." Morgan, 657 P.2d at 753 (quotation and citation omitted). 
6
 In her petition, Rhinehart only alleged that this claim was actionable as ineffective 
assistance of counsel. R. 7-13. She did not separately argue that the plea itself was rendered 
involuntary by Corporon's alleged conduct. See generally id. The State accordingly 
confines its analysis to Corporon's alleged ineffectiveness. 
For clarity, however, the State notes that any direct challenge to the plea on this basis 
would have been procedurally barred because Rhinehart could have raised it in a motion to 
withdraw the plea. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(c) (West 2009). 
Additionally, Rhinehart has separately argued that the failure to file such a motion was also 
ineffective. As discussed below in Point 11(B)(7), that claim was also appropriately 
dismissed. 
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Here, Rhinehart's factual allegations do not create a "genuine" issue of material fact 
about whether Corporon's conduct at the plea hearing met this standard. As noted, courts are 
not required to draw "every possible inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, 
in favor of the nonmoving party." IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2008 UT J 3 , fl 19Ar,Instead, 
courts are only required "to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
Rhinehart is alleging that Corporon's grip on her shoulder at the hearing was so 
physically coercive that she pleaded guilty against her will. R. 11-13. But the picture she 
provided of that hearing (R. 199, attached as Addendum F) does not support this claim, even 
when drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. Instead, as noted by the district court in 
its written ruling, this picture actually shows Corporon touching Rhinehart's shoulder in 
what is transparently a comforting manner. See id.; see also R. 234. 
Moreover, the conduct at issue occurred in open court, in full view of the judge, the 
bailiffs, the prosecutors, members of the public, and even the press. See R. 25-26, 199 
(documenting the press coverage of this hearing). Despite this, the transcript from the plea 
hearing contains no comment from anyone about Corporon doing anything that was 
threatening or improper. But if Corporan was actually "beatfing]" Rhinehart "into 
submission to plead to the charge" as Rhinehart is now claiming, R. 193, the judge would 
have noticed this and said something about it. Yet no one said anything at this hearing that 
would support such a claim. Instead, the only commentary7 about the voluntariness of the 
plea came from Rhinehart herself, who repeatedly told the court under oath that she was not 
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being coerced into pleading guilty. R. 125,129-31. Absent some evidence to the contrary, 
Rhinehart "must be bound to the answers [s]he provide[d] during a plea colloquy." Ramos, 
170F.3dat566. 
Thus, Rhinehart's proffered evidence creates no genuine issue of material fact 
suggesting the Corporon physically coerced Rhinehart into pleading guilty. This claim fails 
as a matter of law. 
Prejudice: Rhinehart's prejudice claim also fails because her proffered facts do not 
establish that Corporon's conduct at the plea hearing had anything to do with Rhinehart's 
decision to plead guilty. To the contrary, the unrebutted record shows that this conduct 
occurred after Rhinehart had decided to plead guilty, not before. This was confirmed at the 
outset of the plea hearing. There, the court noted for the record that it had scheduled the 
change-of-plea hearing because of a conversation it had with both parties Has previous day in 
which the parties informed the court that a plea agreement had been reached. R. 124-25. 
Rhinehart also confirmed this in the plea affidavit, where she acknowledged under oath that 
she had discussed the agreement with her attorneys before deciding to accept it. See R. 112, 
117. Thus, because Corporon's allegedly coercive physical conduct occurred after Rhinehart 
had already made the decision to plead, it could not have made her decision involuntary. 
In addition, this claim also contradicts Rhinehart's own sworn statements. In the plea 
affidavit, she agreed that "[n]o threats or promises of any sort" had prompted her plea. R. 
117. Rhinehart signed that statement in open court at the close of the plea hearing. R. 154-
55. Before she signed it, the court asked her on the record, while she was still under oath, 
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whether her decision was the result of any "threats." R. 152. Rhinehart said there was not 
R. 153. As noted, an affidavit which contradicts an earlier sworn statement should be 
"disregarded," and therefore does not defeat a summary judgment motion. Floyd, 113 P.2d 
at 403. ,, .^-v.,^^^,;.. 
Finally, as discussed above, Rhinehart must show that it would have been rational for 
her to have rejected the deal but for the deficient performance at issue. Thus, she must prove 
that it would have been rational for her to go to trial and risk possible execution if Corporon 
had not placed her hand on Rliinehart's shoulder at the plea hearing. Rhinehart has not done 
this. For all of these reasons, this claim fails as a matter of law. 
6. The State was entitled to relief as a matter of law on Rhinehart's claim 
that Corporon was ineffective for not alerting the court that 
Rhinehart was too depressed to enter a valid plea. 
Rhinehart's next ineffective assistance claim is based on Rhinehart's alleged 
depression at the time of the plea. R. 11-13. As with her coercion claim, Rhinehart's 
petition only alleged ineffective assistance, and she did not separately ask for relief under the 
PCRA based on a claim that the plea was involuntary. See generally R. 9-13. 
Rhinehart's briefing below and on appeal have never clearly articulated the alleged 
link between Rhinehart's mental state and Corporon's alleged ineffectiveness. So far as the 
State can determine, it appears that Rhinehart's claim is that Corporon should have known 
7
 As with the coercion claim, however, any direct challenge to the plea on this basis 
would have been procedurally barred because Rhinehart could have raised it in a motion to 
withdraw the plea, but did not. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(c). The State 
limits its response accordingly. In addition, as discussed below in Point 11(B)(7), Rhinehart 
has not established that Corporon was ineffective for not filing such a motion. 
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that Rhinehart was suffering from mental anxieties, and that Corporon should have then 
advised the judge that Rhinehart should not be allowed to plead that day. R. 11-13. In 
essence, Rhinehart is apparently claiming that her mental anxieties were so profound that day 
that any plea would have been involuntary, that Corporon knew this, and that Corporon 
should have advised the court accordingly. Id. 
From the State's review of the record, these alleged facts supported this claim: (1) 
Rhinehart5 s affidavit, where she says that she "was clinically depressed and was not thinking 
clearly or able to assert" herself when she pleaded (R. 18); (2) Rhinehart's affidavit, where 
she alleges that, "[d]uring the plea hearing, [she] was crying and sobbing uncontrollably," 
that her "knees buckled," and she "was excused from the courtroom after [she] collapsed" 
(R. 19); (3) affidavits from Corporon and a reporter confirming that she was "crying" during 
the hearing (R. 22-23, 26); and (4) a newspaper photo showing that she was crying during 
the hearing (R. 199).8 
Even if this is all true, the State was still entitled to relief as a matter of law because 
the proffered facts establish neither deficient performance nor prejudice. 
Deficient Performance: Rhinehart's claim first fails because she has not proffered 
sufficient facts demonstrating that she was so mentally distraught that day that she could not 
Rhinehart also attached what appeared to be a printout from an unidentified website 
containing anonymous comments about the effects of Lexapro on some people. R. 207-09. 
Rhinehart made no effort to identify the website, let alone establish any link between those 
comments and her actual condition at the time of this plea. This printout therefore lacked 
foundation and was irrelevant, and it therefore could not support her opposition to summary 
judgment. See generally Utah Pv. Civ. P. 56(e); see also GNSP'ship v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 
1157, 1164 (Utah App. 1994) ("Inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment"). 
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enter a valid plea. The reason is that, absent something more, depression and anxiety at the 
time of a plea to murder do not make the plea involuntary. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently rejected this very argument when Nicholls, 
Rhinehart's co-conspirator, raised it as a direct challenge to his plea. The court explained 
that "depression and anxiety are normal responses to the stressful circumstances attending a 
criminal prosecution and possible death sentence," and "'anyone faced with the choice of 
going to trial for capital murder or pleading guilty and receiving life without the possibility 
of parole likely would be depressed and upset.'" Nicholls, 2009 UT 12, ^ 31 (emphasis 
added) (quoting State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, Tj 16, 983 P.3d 556). 
The supreme court has therefore drawn a line between "mild to moderate depression" 
and "psychological issues relevant to [a defendant's] competence to enter a plea." 
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 20. Mere "[depression is not sufficient" to invalidate a plea. 
Nicholls, 2009 UT 12^31. 
Thus, regardless of whether Rhinehart was depressed and crying throughout the plea 
hearing, this does not make her plea invalid. This distress was a natural consequence of 
Rhinehart having murdered her ex-husband, as well her decision to now plead guilty to a 
capital crime. Her depression and tears are not grounds to invalidate that plea, and Rhinehart 
has not shown that Corporon even had a basis for attempting to stop the plea. 
Second, the fact that Rhinehart was allegedly taking an antidepressant at the time of 
the plea does not change this. 
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In Oliver v. State, 2006 UT 60, % 4,147 P.3d 410, the supreme court rejected a request 
for post-conviction relief that was similarly predicated on the petitioner having taken 
psychotropic drugs at the time of the plea. According to the court, "the use of narcotics does 
not per se render a defendant incompetent to stand trial, nor, presumably, to plead guilty." 
Id. at f 7 (quotations and citation omitted). Instead, the plea is valid unless the petitioner 
"prove[s] that his mental faculties were so impaired by drugs when he pleaded that he was 
incapable of full understanding and appreciation of the charges against him, of 
comprehending his constitutional rights, and of realizing the consequences of his plea." Id. 
It is therefore the "drug's effect and not the mere presence of the drug that matters." 
Id. This is because, in "most instances, . . . when a mood-altering drug is given to a 
defendant by a physician, it is to improve the defendant's cognitive abilities." Id. at f 14. 
"In other words, the fact that a defendant has undergone a medical evaluation and is 
receiving medication to treat a psychological infirmity is often evidence weighing in favor of 
a finding that the defendant is capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea." Id 
(emphasis added). When evaluating such claims on appeal, courts are allowed to "rel[y] on 
the defendant's own assurance (and assurances from counsel) that the defendant's mind is 
clear." Id. at f^ 13 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Though Rhinehart repeatedly refers to her alleged use of Lexapro in her brief, her 
post-conviction affidavit does not actually allege that she was taking the drug at the time of 
the plea, see R. 18-19, nor did she put forward any evidence of that through another source. 
Instead, the only evidence that she was actually taking this drug comes from the transcript of 
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the plea colloquy when Rhinehart informed the trial court that she was taking Lexapro for 
"depression." R. 129. 
But after learning of this, the court asked: "Does that medicine in any way affect your 
ability to understand what you're doing here today by pleading guilty?!' Id. Rhinehart 
responded: "No." Id. The court then asked she was "confident" that she was "in complete 
control of [her] mental faculties and able to understand these proceedings?" Id. Rhinehart 
said: "Yes." Id. The court further asked whether she had "any mental, emotional, or 
physical problems or disabilities which would interfere with [her] ability to understand what 
is happening here today?" Id. Rhinehart said: "No." Id. At the close of the hearing, the 
judge accordingly found, based on his "discussion and colloquy with [Rhinehart]," as well as 
its "observation" of her, the plea was entered "knowingly and voluntarily." R. 155. 
Rhinehart cannot defeat summary judgment by contradicting these sworn statements 
in a new affidavit. See Floyd, 113 P.2d at 403; Webster, 675 P.2d at 1172-73. Thus, the 
only evidence in this record regarding Rhinehart's use of Lexapro is her sworn statement at 
the plea hearing that though she was taking it, it had no negative affect on her and did not 
impair her ability to understand what she was doing. The trial court and the post-conviction 
court below were entitled to rely on this. Oliver, 2006 UT 60, \ 13. Given this, even if 
Rhinehart was crying and upset during her plea hearing, and even if she was depressed, she 
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still has not shown that she was so mentally distraught that she could not voluntarily plead 
guilty. On these facts, the State was entitled to relief as a matter of law.9 
Third, even if Rhinehart has alleged sufficient facts to show that she could not 
voluntarily plead guilty that day, her deficient performance claim still fails because her 
proffered facts do not establish that Corporon should have known that Rhinehart was so 
mentally distraught that she could not enter a valid plea. Again, while Corporon clearly 
knew that Rhinehart was distraught and crying at the plea hearing, that would not have been 
a sufficient basis for Corporon to have rendered Rhinehart incapable of pleading. Instead, as 
discussed, Corporon would have to have known that Rhinehart's mental issues went beyond 
mere "depression." Nicholls, 2009 UT 12, If 31. 
Nothing in this record demonstrates that Corporon knew this. In her affidavit, 
Corporon affirms that Rhinehart was crying during the plea hearing, but says nothing about 
knowing that Rhinehart suffered from any mental disorder that would have rendered a plea 
involuntary. R. 22-23. And in her affidavit, Rhinehart alleges that she was "clinically 
depressed," but she never alleges that she told Corporon this. R. 18-20. This omission is 
significant. As recognized by the Supreme Court, the reasonableness of Corporon's conduct 
"depends critically" on the "information supplied by" Rhinehart. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
691. Thus, even if it were true that Rhinehart suffered from such a condition, she still has 
9
 Below, Rhinehart further alleged that she "collapsed" during the colloquy and had to 
be "excused from the courtroom." R. 19. Rhinehart does not rely on that allegation on 
appeal. In any event, the transcript from the plea colloquy shows that what actually 
happened was that Rhinehart asked if she could sit down'after the plea colloquy had 
concluded and the plea had been entered, and that she then asked to be excused from the 
courtroom when the only thing left was scheduling a future hearing. R. 160. 
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not established that Corporon knew about it—and she therefore has not established that 
Corporon performed deficiently by failing to alert the court to it. 
Prejudice: As discussed, Rhinehart can only establish prejudice by showing that the 
result below would have been different but for the alleged error. Thus, her claim must be 
that if Corporon had recognized that Rhinehart was too distraught that day to properly plead 
guilty, and if Corporon had somehow stopped the court from accepting the plea, Rhinehart 
would not have pleaded guilty during some future proceeding once she was in a proper state 
of mind. Thus, she still must show that it would have been rational for her to have rejected 
this plea on this basis. 
As discussed above, however, there was overwhelming testimonial and documentary 
evidence of her guilt, and Rhinehart has only pointed to the possible testimony of two self-
interested felons in response. Moreover, Rhinehart wholly fails to account for the fact that 
this deal gave her a substantial, tangible benefit: specifically, it prevented the State from 
executing her. This claim accordingly fails. 
7. The State was entitled to relief on Rhinehart5 s claim that Corporon 
was ineffective for not filing a motion to withdraw the plea, 
Rhinehart's last claim regarding Corporon is that Corporon refused to file a motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea. Pet. Br. 11-12, 19. This was supported by Rhinehart's affidavit, 
where she alleged that she "called Corporon five days after entering the plea and asked her 
then and repeatedly thereafter to move to withdraw the plea, but she refused." R. 19. 
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For purposes of summary judgment, the State must assume that this is true. But 
judgment is still appropriate on this claim as a matter of law because Rhinehart has not 
alleged facts demonstrating that she was prejudiced by this failure. 
In order to establish prejudice for purposes of this ineffective assistance claim, 
Rhinehart must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. But the "failure of counsel to make motions or 
objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance" of 
counsel. State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, \ 34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citation omitted); 
see also State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, *{ 13, 186 P.3d 1023. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004) plainly states that a defendant can only 
withdraw a guilty plea by demonstrating that the plea was unknowing and involuntary. See 
also Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, ^  26,184 P.3d 1226 ("having pleaded guilty, a defendant's 
only avenue for challenging his conviction is to claim that he did not voluntarily or 
intelligently enter his plea"). Thus, if Corporon had filed the motion to withdraw, it could 
only have succeeded if Rhinehart could show that she either did "not understand the nature 
of the constitutional protections that [s]he [was] waiving," or that she had "such an 
incomplete understanding of the charge that [her] plea cannot stand as an intelligent 
admission of guilt." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976) (citations 
omitted). As discussed, there is no proof that this plea was deficient under that standard. 
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Thus, even if Corporon ineffectively refused to file a motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea, Rhinehart still not has not shown that that motion could have been successful. As a 
result, her facts do not show that she was prejudiced, and the claim was appropriately 
dismissed as a matter of law. 
8. The State was entitled to relief as a matter of law on Rhinehart5 s claim 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that the misplea 
doctrine applied to this case. 
Finally, Rhinehart claims that her appellate counsel was ineffective. Pet. Br. 14-15, 
19. "[T]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a Petitioner must 
prove that appellate counsel's representation 'fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
conduct and that the deficient performance prejudiced'" her. Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, 
lf39,175 P.3d530 (quotingBrunerv. Carver, 920P.2d 1153,1157 (Utah 1996)). Toprove 
that appellate counsel "was ineffective for omitting a claim, [s]he must show that the 'issue 
was obvious from the trial record and . . . probably would have resulted in reversal on 
appeal.'" Id. (citation omitted); see also Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, H 25, 194 P.3d 913. 
"Appellate counsel is not obligated to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal," however, 
but is instead allowed to "winnow out weaker claims in order to focus effectively on those 
more likely to prevail." Lafferty, 2007 UT 73, If 49 (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, 
an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim only succeeds if a petitioner shows that 
there was "a reasonable probability that, but for [her] counsel's unreasonable failure to file a 
merits brief, [s]he would have prevailed on [her] appeal.5" Kell, 2008 UT 62, K 25. 
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Here, Rhinehart's claim is that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that 
Rhinehart's plea could be invalidated under the misplea doctrine. Pet. Br. 14-15, 19. 
According to Rhinehart, appellate counsel should have argued that the misplea doctrine 
applied because of Corporon's alleged misadvice, Rhinehart'^emotional distress at the plea 
hearing, and the possibility that Rhinehart may have been innocent. Id. Summary judgment 
was appropriate on this claim for three reasons. 
First, it was not "obvious" that Rhinehart could have asked for relief under the 
misplea doctrine. A defendant who wishes to withdraw a plea must file a motion under Utah 
Code Annotated § 77-13-6. By statute, that is the "only" way that a defendant can challenge 
the plea. See id. 
The misplea doctrine is different. It is a judicial creation that applies when a plea has 
been accepted and when a trial court—either on its own motion or at the behest of the 
prosecution—rescinds the plea agreement over the objection of the defendant. See State v. 
Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 1986). The test for granting a misplea focuses, in part, on 
whether there would be "undue prejudice to defendant" if it were granted—a test that would 
make little sense if the doctrine were available for use by the defendant. State v. Moss, 921 
P.2d 1021,1026 (Utah App. 1996) (emphasis added). With one exception discussed below, 
it is therefore significant that all of the Utah decisions applying this doctrine have involved 
cases in which the State or the judge (or in some cases, the victims) initiated the misplea 
proceedings. See, e.g., Kay, 111 P.2d at 1296-97, 1302-06 (trial court rescinded unilateral 
plea at request of prosecution and over objection of defendant); State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, 
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f^l[ 11,16,40 n.14,44 P.3d 756 (victim unsuccessfully sought misplea based on violation of 
victim's right to be heard at change-of-plea hearing); State v. Lopez, 2005 UT App 496, fflf 2-
8,14-27,128 P.3d 1 (trial court sua sponte set aside guilty plea before entry of judgment, but 
gave defendant a week to decide if he wanted to re-enter plea); State v. Bernert, 2QQ4 UT 
App 321, l|ffl 2-5, 7-12, 100 P.3d 221 (trial court rescinded acceptance of plea at 
prosecution's request and over defendant's objection so that case could be transferred to 
county for prosecution of greater charge); State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, fflf 2-7,12-32, 
17 P.3d 1145 (justice court rescinded defendant's guilty pleas over his objection so that 
greater charges could be brought in district court); State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1022-27 
(Utah App. 1996) (trial court sua sponte declared misplea upon discovering defendant's 
guilty plea in abeyance violated statute). 
The State has found only one Utah case—an unpublished memorandum decision—in 
which a defendant sought the misplea. See State v. Schubarth, 2005 UT App 166U. There, 
Schubarth entered a plea in abeyance that was clearly illegal under the controlling statute. 
Id. at * 1. Because the plea was clearly illegal, this Court held a misplea was appropriate. Id. 
Although this Court applied the misplea doctrine in reaching its decision, Schubarth was 
more about a plea that was void from the outset than it was about a misplea, where the trial 
court or prosecutor had violated the terms of the plea agreement. 
Thus, the Legislature has already given defendants the ability to file a motion to 
withdraw a plea. The misplea doctrine is something else entirely, a tool for use when it is the 
State, the judge, or perhaps the victims, who desire to invalidate the plea. Given the 
44 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
overwhelming authority suggesting this, as well as the lack of any published authority 
allowing defendants to use this as an alternative means for invalidating a plea, Rhinehart has 
not shown that it should have been "obvious" to her appellate counsel that misplea relief was 
even available. Her claim fails for this reason alone. . w 
Second, even the misplea doctrine was available to Rhinehart, it also was not obvious 
the supreme court could have entertained a request for a misplea in Rhinehart's direct appeal. 
As discussed above, Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 explicitly states that a defendant can 
only move to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. In State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 
^ 13-20, 114 P.3d 585, the supreme court held that this limitation is jurisdictional. A 
defendant's failure to comply with this requirement therefore "extinguishes a defendant's 
right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea" on direct appeal. Id, at f 17 (emphasis 
added); accord State v. Grimmett, 2007 UT 11, ffif 24-26,152 P.3d 306; State v. Reyes, 2002 
UT 13, If 3, 40 P.3d 630. Rhinehart has pointed to no authority, and the State is aware of 
none, definitively holding that the misplea doctrine supercedes this plain statutory limitation 
on the court's jurisdiction. She has therefore failed to show that, based on the law available 
to appellate counsel, it should have been obvious that the court had jurisdiction to entertain a 
challenge to a plea under the guise of a misplea argument. 
Third, even if appellate counsel had requested relief under the misplea doctrine, and 
even if the supreme court had decided to address the request on its merits, it is still not 
obvious that this request would have been successful. Subject to the timing limitations 
discussed above, the misplea doctrine only allows a court to invalidate a guilty plea under a 
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limited set of circumstances. Specifically, "'a misplea can properly be granted (1) where 
obvious reversible error has been committed in connection with the terms of the acceptance 
of the plea agreement and (2) no undue prejudice to defendant is apparent."5 Moss, 921 P.2d 
at 1026 (citation omitted). Utah courts have also granted mispleas where "'some fraud or 
deception by one party leads to the acceptance of the plea agreement by the other party or the 
court.'" Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, ^ 28 (quotingKay, 111 P.2d at 1305). 
Rhinehart's misplea argument is based on the same claims of error at issue in her 
claims about Corporon's conduct. As set forth above, there was no obvious error with 
respect to any of these claims, and Rhinehart has not even alleged that her plea was the 
product of fraud or deception. Rhinehart's appellate counsel therefore did not act deficiently 
by failing to request a misplea on direct appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Rhinehart did not put forth any evidence that created any genuine issue of material 
fact, and the district court therefore correctly granted the State's request for summary 
judgment. This Court should affirm the dismissal of Rhinehart's petition. 
Respectfully submitted February *Z\, 2012. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
RYAljIp. TENNEY 71 
Assistant Attorney General ^ 
Counsel for Respondent 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 12, Defenses and Objections 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, 
a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the 
summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after 
service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party 
served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within 
twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in 
the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered 
by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order 
otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of 
time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion 
directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for 
responding to the remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on 
the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice 
of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite 
statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) 
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to 
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be 
made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection 
is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a 
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such 
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert 
at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall 
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[ 
be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a 
motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on 
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and 
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that 
the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more 
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall 
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is 
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of 
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the 
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court 
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may 
join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party 
makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and 
objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the 
party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or 
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
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(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented 
either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an 
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim 
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted/or by motion for 
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection 
or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in 
the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after 
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a 
waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action 
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a 
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which 
may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the 
court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file 
a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such 
costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be 
required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, 
upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56. Summary Judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment 
is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and 
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain 
what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts 
are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the 
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the 
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. 
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response, 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to 
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court 
shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be 
adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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State v. Rhinehart, 167 P.3d 1046 (2007) 
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167 P.3d 1046 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Tamra RHINEHART, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20050635. I Aug. 14, 2007. 
Synopsis 
Background: Following jury trial in which defendant 
was convicted of burglary, defendant was convicted on 
negotiated guilty plea in the First District Court, Logan 
Department, Gordon J. Low, J., of aggravated murder. 
Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Nehring, J., held that: 
1 Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction on direct appeal to 
review validity of guilty plea, and 
2 defendant waived any alleged defect in bindover by entering 
guilty plea. 
Affirmed. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*1046 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Laura B. Dupaix, Asst. 
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, N. George Daines, Donald G. 
Linton, Scott L. Wyatt, Logan, for plaintiff. 
Elizabeth Hunt, Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
Opinion 
NEHRING, Justice: 
% 1 Michael Boudrero's body was discovered lying in the 
basement of a home under construction in North Logan, Utah, 
in July 2003. He had been shot twice, once in the chest and 
once in the back. Mr. Boudrero's ex-wife, Tamra Rhinehart, 
pled guilty to aggravated murder for her participation in 
the crime that took Mr. Boudrero's life. The district court 
sentenced her to life in prison without the possibility of 
parole. 
11 2 After her sentence was imposed, Ms. Rhinehart brought 
this appeal. She places a *1047 sizeable catalogue of issues 
before us. We will speak to the merits of two of the issues. 
We hold that the relevant statutory requirement contained 
in section 77-13-6—an attempt to withdraw a guilty plea 
on appeal must be preceded by a motion before the district 
court—is constitutional and has jurisdictional effect. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2004). We also hold that Ms. 
Rhinehart waived any right to challenge her bindover when 
she entered her guilty plea. Based on these holdings, we 
affirm the district court. 
BACKGROUND 
H 3 Police discovered Mr. Boudrero's body lying in the 
basement of a vacant North Logan home still undergoing 
construction. Mr. Boudrero had been shot twice and left face 
down in the doorway of a storage room. Within a week of 
Mr. Boudrero's murder, police received an anonymous phone 
call from a woman who claimed to know the murderer's 
identity. The woman, later identified as Mamie Christianson 
and Ms. Rhinehart's hairdresser, suggested that Ms. Rhinehart 
was responsible for Mr. Boudrero's death. Ms. Christianson 
proposed police contact Jessica Goalen, Ms. Rhinehart's 
former babysitter and friend who, as we shall soon see, proved 
to be a source of valuable information about Ms. Rhinehart's 
ties to the murder. Ms. Christianson also suggested that Ms. 
Rhinehart had a boyfriend from South Africa who was likely 
involved. 
% 4 That boyfriend was Craig Nicholls. Ms. Rhinehart met 
Mr. Nicholls earlier in 2003 on the Internet. Mr. Nicholls 
purchased a prepaid phone card in Brigham City, Utah, called 
Mr. Boudrero from a pay phone, and lured Mr. Boudrero to 
the vacant house by indicating that he had plumbing work 
at the site that Mr. Boudrero might perform. When Mr. 
Boudrero arrived at the house that fateful July evening, Mr. 
Nicholls shot him. 
K 5 Although Ms. Rhinehart was not present at the shooting, 
she had incurred sizeable debts and had persuaded Mr. 
Nicholls to kill Mr. Boudrero for her pecuniary gain. For 
months prior to the murder, Ms. Rhinehart had been trying 
to secure insurance policies on the life of her former husband 
that named herself or one of her minor children as beneficiary. 
When Mr. Boudrero learned about the existence of one 
policy, he cancelled it. Other attempts by Ms. Rhinehart to 
purchase insurance on Mr. Boudrero's life failed because 
the applications were incomplete or because the companies 
determined that the size of the policies was disproportionate 
to Mr. Boudrero's means and therefore constituted excess 
coverage. A persistent Ms. Rhinehart finally succeeded in 
purchasing a $50,000 life insurance policy for Mr. Boudrero 
in April 2003 in which she listed herself as the beneficiary. 
Because the insurance company required Mr. Boudrero's 
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signature prior to issuance, Ms. Rhinehart forged it. Ms. 
Rhinehart described these efforts to secure life insurance and 
the plan to kill her former husband to Ms. Goalen, who later 
recounted the information to police. 
U 6 Police arrested Mr. Nicholls. He later pled guilty 
to aggravated murder and in accordance with his plea 
agreement, provided police with a sworn statement regarding 
his and Ms. Rhinehart's participation in Mr. Boudrero's 
murder. Mr. Nicholls agreed to testify against Ms. Rhinehart. 
(We considered an improperly brought challenge to his guilty 
plea in State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, H 6, 148 P.3d 990.) 
U 7 In light of these events and associated evidence, the State 
charged Ms. Rhinehart with one count of aggravated murder, 
a capital felony in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-202; 
one count of forgery, a third degree felony in violation of 
section 76-6-501; and four counts of communications fraud, 
a second degree felony in violation of section 76-10-1801. In 
a separate information, the State charged Ms. Rhinehart with 
one count of burglary, a second degree felony in violation 
of section 76-6-202; three counts of theft, a second degree 
felony in violation of section 76-6-404; and another count of 
communications fraud. 
H 8 The district court held a single preliminary hearing 
where both Mr. Nicholls and Ms. Goalen invoked their rights 
against self-incrimination and refused to testify against Ms. 
Rhinehart. Instead, the district court *1048 admitted Mr. 
Nicholls's and Ms. Goalen's sworn statements into evidence. 
After being bound over on all charges, Ms. Rhinehart 
unsuccessfully moved to quash the bindover order at the 
preliminary hearing on the grounds that admission of hearsay 
violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause of the 
United States Constitution. 
U 9 The burglary and aggravated murder cases were ultimately 
severed. Ms. Rhinehart was convicted in the burglary case, 
which proceeded first. She pled guilty nearly three months 
later to aggravated murder in exchange for the State's 
agreement to drop all other charges and to refrain fro mi 
seeking the death penalty. Ms. Rhinehart appeals from this 
plea. 
ANALYSIS 
I. WE LACK JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER 
MS. RHINEHART'S CHALLENGE TO THE 
LAWFULNESS OF HER GUILTY PLEA 
1 2 K 10 The Utah Constitution mandates that all criminal 
defendants be afforded the right of appeal. Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 12; see Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, \ 26, 122 P.3d 628. 
Moreover, a defendant who has " 'been prevented in some 
meaningful way from proceeding' " with a direct appeal of 
right is likely to have been denied the due process of law 
guaranteed in article I, section 7. Manning, 2005 UT 61, 1) 26, 
122 P.3d 628 (quoting State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1166 
(Utah Ct.App. 1998)). 
U 11 Ms. Rhinehart contends that the ineffectiveness of her 
trial counsel caused her to enter her plea and to fail to bring a 
timely motion to withdraw it. Under these circumstances, Ms. 
Rhinehart insists, the requirement contained in section 77-
13-6 that she move to withdraw her guilty plea as a condition 
to challenging her plea on direct appeal unconstitutionally 
deprives her of her right to appeal. 
H 12 Mindful that in State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 
585, we settled the question of whether section 77-13-6 
was jurisdictional and constitutional by answering "yes" to 
both inquiries, Ms. Rhinehart has nevertheless labored to set 
herself, her circumstances, and her legal claims apart from 
those present in Merrill. See also Grimmett v. State, 2007 
UT 11, H 8, 152 P.3d 306 (confirming the constitutional 
and jurisdictional nature of the statute that experienced 
a substantial revision from the version in Merrill ). She 
argues that we should now answer "no" to the two Merrill 
questions because it was her lawyer's fault that she entered 
her plea and failed to bring a timely motion to withdraw 
it. According to Ms. Rhinehart, neither Merrill nor any of 
our other pronouncements on section 77-13-6 confronted a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. She claims that this 
distinction matters. 
3 K 13 It does not. The ineffectiveness of a defendant's 
counsel may take many forms and result in relieving 
a criminal defendant of an undesirable result. The 
ineffectiveness of counsel that contributes to a flawed guilty 
plea, however, can spare a defendant the consequences of her 
plea only if the defendant makes out the same case required 
of every defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea: that the 
plea was not knowing and voluntary. See State v. West, 765 
P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988) (remanding the case to determine 
whether the defendant's original plea was knowing and 
voluntary where the facts suggest that the defendant "received 
nothing in return for his guilty plea" and "apparently received 
seriously deficient information from all persons involved in 
his case"). As a practical matter, there is no alleged flaw in a 
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guilty plea of a defendant represented by counsel that could 
not be attributed in some way to deficient representation. 
Examples abound in our cases, but a review confined only to 
the cases cited by Ms. Rhinehart, as illustrative of appeals that 
did not involve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
provides sufficient evidence to defend this point. Mr. Merrill 
filed a late motion to withdraw his plea because he did not 
discover until too late the effect the psychotropic medicine he 
was taking may have had on his ability to enter a knowing and 
voluntary plea. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, H 9, 114 P.3d 585. In 
State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 40 P.3d 630, Mr. Reyes claimed 
that the trial court committed plain error when it failed to 
strictly comply with rule 11 of the *1049 Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Id. U 3. The defendant in State v. Mullins, 
2005 UT 43,116 P.3d 374, pointed to duress and his counsel's 
misrepresentation of critical aspects of the plea agreement 
as grounds for his motion to withdraw his plea. Id. % 3. 
Each of these cases could easily have been recast as claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel and, presumably, have 
been pursued under rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure as Ms. Rhinehart seeks to do here. 
K 14 The classification within which she seeks refuge—that 
defendants who seek leave to withdraw pleas based on claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel are free of the constraints 
of section 77-13-6—is, therefore, a phantom classification. 
To honor this classification would be to invite every tardy 
application to withdraw a plea to be styled as a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a consequence that would 
vitiate section 77-13-6. We therefore hold that claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel raised in the context of 
challenges to the lawfulness of guilty pleas are governed by 
section 77-13-6 as construed by Merrill and confirmed by 
Grimmett. We therefore are without jurisdiction to consider 
Ms. Rhinehart's claim. 
II. MS. RHINEHART WAIVED HER RIGHT TO 
CHALLENGE DEFECTS IN HER BINDOVER 
WHEN SHE ENTERED HER GUILTY PLEA 
4 5 6 U 15 Ms. Rhinehart next asks us to relieve her of the 
effect of her guilty plea because her preliminary hearing and 
bindover were infected with errors. Except in those instances 
in which errors affect the court's jurisdiction or where claims 
of error are expressly preserved for appeal, a conviction 
or guilty plea acts as a waiver of earlier procedural flaws. 
See, e.g., Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, % 31, 165 P.3d 
1195; State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 937-40 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
As we explained in Parsons, "The general rule applicable 
in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by 
pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all 
of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby 
waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-
plea constitutional violations." 781 P.2d at 1278. 
\ 16 Ms. Rhinehart attempts to avoid falling prey to the 
general rule in two ways. First, she asserts that she did 
not enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea and therefore 
could not have waived defects in the preliminary hearing and 
bindover. Next, she insists that even if her plea were lawful, it 
is not the preliminary hearing and bindover itself with which 
she takes issue, but rather with constitutional deprivations of 
her right to confront witnesses at the preliminary hearing. She 
argues that since those constitutional defects are jurisdictional 
and not subject to waiver, we must take up their merits. We 
disagree. 
\ 17 We may with dispatch dispose of Ms. Rhinehart's 
reinvocation of her challenge to the lawfulness of her plea. 
Put simply, she cannot achieve through a challenge to the 
bindover what she was foreclosed from doing by section 77-
13-6—assail the lawfulness of her plea. 
\ 18 We turn, then, to Ms. Rhinehart's claim that she was 
deprived of constitutional rights in the preliminary hearing 
and that these transgressions stripped the court of jurisdiction. 
We note at the outset that the Utah Constitution expressly 
permits the waiver of a preliminary hearing "by the accused 
with the consent of the State." Utah Const, art. 1, § 13. In 
light of this provision, it is difficult for us to conceive of 
why a constitutionally authorized waiver of a preliminary 
hearing would be foreclosed by the existence of defects, even 
constitutional defects, that occurred during the hearing. Of 
course, as Ms. Rhinehart properly notes, she never expressly 
waived her right to a preliminary hearing and, in fact, fought 
to exhaustion to prevail on her claims of preliminary hearing 
error. The fact that she put up a stern fight does not mean 
that she could not have surrendered and expressly waived her 
constitutional challenges by waiving her preliminary hearing. 
In our view, the entry of Ms. Rhinehart's guilty plea achieved 
the same waiver of her constitutional claims as a waiver of 
her preliminary hearing would have accomplished. 
*1050 7 \ 19 Finally, we find little merit in Ms. Rhinehart's 
claim that the alleged denial of her right to confront 
witnesses at the preliminary hearing implicated the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the court and was, therefore, immune 
from waiver. Without subject matter jurisdiction, a court is 
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powerless to adjudicate a case. See United States v. Cotton, 
535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). 
Ms. Rhinehart directs us to State v. Marshall, an unpublished 
memorandum decision from our court of appeals, and its 
observation that "a preliminary hearing is essential to a court's 
jurisdiction over a felony." 2005 UT App 269U, para. 2,2005 
WL 1405321. We are, of course, not bound by decisions 
issued by our court of appeals. We take note, however, that 
nothing in the court of appeals' decision leads us to conclude 
that defects in a preliminary hearing strip a district court 
of subject matter jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to 
assess the lawfulness of a preliminary hearing and bindover 
and to adjudicate waivers of defects in preliminary hearings 
and bindovers in the context of taking a guilty plea from an 
accused. 
Tl 20 We have held that a district court is empowered to 
conduct a trial in the wake of an allegedly flawed bindover 
because a subsequent conviction beyond a reasonable doubt 
cures any bindover defect. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 
D 26, 128 P.3d 1171. Ms. Rhinehart attempts to overcome 
this proposition with the contention that a guilty plea is not 
entitled to the same dignity as a "unanimous jury verdict 
reflecting proof beyond a reasonable doubt." It is not evident 
to us why a guilty plea is inferior to a jury verdict in this 
respect, but more importantly, this argument fails to address 
the central question of why a district court may exercise 
subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a trial after a defective 
bindover but not take a plea. 
III. MS. RHINEHART FAILED TO PRESERVE 
THE OTHER ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
8 Tl 21 Ms. Rhinehart has asked us to take up the merits 
of her challenges to the manner in which the penalty phase 
of her proceeding was conducted and to the constitutionality 
End of Document 
of Utah's life without parole statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-207(5) (2004). These issues were not preserved below. 
Because they were not, we will not consider them absent plain 
error or exceptional circumstances. See State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, % 11, 10 P.3d 346. Considering this rule, defendants 
are best served by presenting unpreserved arguments to this 
court through the lens of one or all of these exceptions. 
Without more, the presentation of the merits of an issue 
cannot access an exception to the preservation doctrine. Not 
only has Ms. Rhinehart failed to persuade us that any of her 
unpreserved issues are eligible for either exception to the 
preservation rule, she has declined to present an argument to 
support the application of either exception to those issues. We 
accordingly decline to address their merits. 
CONCLUSION 
U 22 Because Ms. Rhinehart failed to make a timely motion 
to withdraw her guilty plea as required by statute, we lack 
jurisdiction to consider the validity of her plea on appeal. 
Ms. Rhinehart's ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot 
successfully evade this well-established jurisdictional bar. 
We further hold that Ms. Rhinehart waived the right to 
challenge the validity of her bindover when she entered 
a guilty plea. We decline to address the merits of Ms. 
Rhinehart's remaining unpreserved issues. Accordingly, we 
affirm the district court. 
H 23 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice 
WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice PARRISH 
concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion. 
Parallel Citations 
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MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 328-1162 
Facsimile: (801) 328-9565 
SCOTT WILLIAMS #6687 
Attorney for Defendant 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 220-0700 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TAMRA RHINEHART, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT TN ADVANCE OF PLEA 
Case No. 031100633 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and that I understand the 
following facts and rights, and that I have had the assistance of counsel in reviewing, 
understanding and completing this form: 
1. The nature of the charge against me to which I have agreed to plead guilty is 
Aggravated Murder, a capital felony, in violation of U.C. A. Section 76-5-202(l)(f)(1953 as 
ft 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
amended). I have had an opportunity to discuss the nature of the charge with my attorneys, and I 
understand the charge and the elements that the government is required to prove. 
2. I understand that the elements of the charge of Aggravated Murder are that I 
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Michael Boudrero for the purpose of pecuniary 
gain. I understand that Utah law provides that "every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages or intentionally aids anotlier person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. I further understand 
that a plea of guilty is an admission of all these elements. 
3. I know that the maximum possible penalty provided for by law for a conviction of 
Aggravated Murder, under the terms of this plea, is imprisonment for life without possibility of 
parole, and a fine, or both. I know that the minimum possible sentence under this plea is an 
indeterminate prison term of not less than 20 years and which may be for life. I further 
understand that this sentence can be consecutive to the sentence I am currently serving. 
4. I know that I can be represented by an attorney at every stage of these 
proceedings, and I know that if I cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent me. 
I am in fact being represented by Mary C. Corporon and Scott Williams. 
5. I know that I have a right to plead "not guilty" and I know that I have entered a 
plea of "not guilty," and I can continue to persist in that plea. 
6. I know that I have a right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury (in fact I 
presently have a jury trial scheduled to begin on April 7, 2005), and I know that if I were to stand 
trial by jury: 
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a. I have a right to the presumption of innocence; 
b. I have a right to the assistance of two qualified counsel at every stage of 
the proceedings; 
, c. I have a right to see and observe the witnesses who testify against me; 
d. My attorneys can cross-examine, in open court, all witnesses who testify 
against me; 
e. I can call such witnesses as I desire, and I can obtain subpoenas to require 
the attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If I cannot afford to pay the witness and 
mileage fees of those witnesses, the government will pay them for me; 
f. I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do not have to testify at any 
trial Whether or not I testify is my decision made in consultation with my attorneys; 
g. If I do not testify, the jury will be told that no inference adverse to me may 
be drawn from my failure to testify; 
h. The government must prove each and every element of the offense charged 
against me beyond a reasonable doubt; 
i. It requires a unanimous verdict of a jury of twelve to convict me; and 
j . If I were to be convicted, I can appeal, and if I cannot afford to appeal, the 
government will pay the costs of appeal, including the services of two appointed counsel. 
I AM FREELY, VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVING ALL OF 
THE FOREGOING RIGHTS. 
7. I know that under a plea of guilty there will not be a trial of any kind. I will not 
have a jury hearing of any kind, and the sentence will be imposed by the assigned judge herein. 
3 
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8. I understand that by pleading guilty there will be no appellate review of any lawful 
sentence imposed. I know I may appeal a sentence imposed under this plea of guilty only in the 
following circumstances: 
a. If the sentence was imposed in violation of law; 
b. If the sentence was a result of an incorrect application of sentencing law; 
or 
c. If the sentence is greater than the law allows as to fine or imprisonment, or 
. • ' • * • 
is greater than the sentence specified in this agreement. 
9. I represent that the following facts regarding the charge to which I am pleading 
guilty are true and correct or that I do not dispute facts referenced below for which I do not have 
personal knowledge: 
a. In early 2003,1 became acquainted with my co-defendant, Mr. Craig 
Nicholls; 
b. In 2003,1 made statements to Mr. Nicholls which he understood and 
interpreted as a request on my part for him to murder my former husband, Michael 
Boudrero; 
c. Michael Boudrero was murdered by shooting in Cache County, Utah in 
July of 2003; 
d. I was not present at the time of the shooting of Michael Boudrero, but I am 
informed and believe by reason of my prior conversations with Mr. Nicholls and by 
reason of Mr. Nicholls' subsequent statements, that he is the person who shot Michael 
4 
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Boudrero, and that Mr. Nicholls did so at my request and instigation. I intended the deatli 
of Michael Boudrero to occur by the foregoing circumstances; 
e. I was, therefore, a party accomplice to the murder of Michael Boudrero; 
and 
f. I made efforts to obtain life insurance policy(s) on the life of Michael 
Boudrero and intended that I or my minor children would receive life insurance benefits 
and/or social security benefits upon the death of Michael Boudrero. 
10. The only terms and conditions pertaining to this plea agreement between me and 
the State are as follows: 
a. I will plead guilty to Count 1 of the Information. Aggravated Murder; 
b. The State agrees to dismiss the remaining counts of the Information; 
c. The State agrees it will not seek and is specifically withdrawing its request 
to impose the death penalty, and the Court will not impose the death penalty; and 
d. Pursuant to Utah law, I agree I will serve a period of incarceration for this 
offense, of either life without possibility of parole, or an indeterminate prison term of not 
less than 20 years and which may be for life, to be determined by the assigned judge 
herein, at an evidentiary sentencing hearing. I understand that at this hearing I may 
produce testimony and evidence in support of a sentence of life and that the State will 
produce testimony and evidence in support of a sentence of life without possibility of 
parole. 
11. I know I have a right to ask the Court any questions I wish to ask concerning my 
rights, or about these proceedings and the plea. 
5 
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12. I make the following representations to the Court: 
a. I am 46 years of age. My education consists of high school. I can read and 
understand English; . 
b. No threats or promises of any sort have been made to me to induce me or 
persuade me to enter this plea, other than the representations of this plea agreement and 
the provisions contained herein; 
c. No one has told me that I would receive probation, or any other form of 
special leniency because of my plea; 
d. I have discussed this case and this plea with my lawyers as much as I wish 
to; 
e. I am satisfied with my lawyers, Mary C. Corporon and Scott Williams; and 
f. My decision to enter this plea was made after full and careful thought, 
with the advice of counsel, with a full understanding of my constitutional, trial, and 
appeal rights, with a full understanding of the evidence the State would adduce at trial in 
. the case and with a full understanding of the consequences of the plea. I was not under the 
influences of any drugs, medications, or intoxicants when the decision to enter this plea 
wTas made and I am not now under the influence of any drugs, medications, or intoxicants. 
13. I understand that I have the right to file a motion to withdraw this plea of guilty 
only if made prior to sentence being imposed. Such a motion, if made, will not be automatically 
granted and will be granted only upon leave of the court and a showing that my plea of guilty was 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not loiowingly and voluntarily made. 
14. I have no mental reservations concerning this plea. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 2005 in open court. 
TAMRA RHINEHAKT l 
Defendant 
^^y<2>z?^?/?&~^ 
fnT) 
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
We certify that we are the attorneys for TAMRA RHINEHART, the Defendant above and 
that we know she has read the statement or that we have read it to her and we have discussed it 
with her and believe that she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent to enter this plea. To the best of our knowledge and belief after an 
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime and factual synopsis of the Defendant's 
criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations and 
declarations made by the Defendant in the foregoing Statement in Advance of Plea are accurate 
and true. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 2005. 
§£OTT WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Defendant 
8 
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNTY ATTORNEY . 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against TAMRA 
RHINEHART, Defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of the Defendant and find that the 
declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered Defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement in Advance of Plea attached or as supplemented 
on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would 
support the conviction of Defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and acceptance 
of the plea would serve the public interest. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 2005 
SCGTXJtfYATT 
Cache County Attorney's Office 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL' DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs Case No. 031100633 
TAMRA RHINEHART, 
Defendant. 
Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing. 
Honorable Gordon J. Low presiding. 
First District Court Courthouse 
Logan, Utah 
March 18, 2005 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
SCOTT L. WYATT 
ERUCE G. WARD 
Deputy County Attorneys 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney at Law 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
Registered Professional Reporter 
First District Court 
P. O. Box 873 
Brigham C i t y , UT 84302-0873 FILED 
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1 THE COURT: Case number 031100633, State of Utah 
2 versus Tamara Rhinehart. This matter is on the calendar this 
3 morning pursuant to a conversation this court had yesterday 
4 with counsel for both the state and the defense. It!s my 
5 understanding that there has been a resolution found in this 
6 case that Ms. Rhinehart, whose trial was set for the 7th of 
7 April through the 4th of May, has decided to enter a change • 
8 of plea, that being a plea of guilty to a third amended 
9 information. 
10 Ms. Rhinehart is present with Ms. Corporon. The state is 
11 represented by Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Ward. Mr. Williams, who is 
12 co-counsel in this matter, is not present. I understand that 
13 Ms. Rhinehart is prepared to waive his presence.on her 
14 behalf. 
15 Procedurally, Ms. Rhinehart, I'm going to ask you to 
16 stand with your attorney at the podium. ITm going to ask the 
17 clerk to administer an oath and have you sworn. It's then my 
18 intent to•conduct a colloquy and discussion with you relative 
19 to this plea. It is a requirement that I find that this plea' 
20 is made intelligently and knowingly, voluntarily and 
21 intentionally. In order to do so, I have prepared a colloquy 
22 for our discussion which you'll follow along with. And then 
23 the state has prepared — actually, Ms. Corporon has 
24 prepared, rather, with the state's approval, a'statement in 
25 advance of plea which will in some form duplicate some of the 
/2.4 
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1 things I'm going to say in our.colloquy. 
2 First, there's been a third information filed which 
3 charges the defendant with a single count of criminal 
4 homicide, aggravated murder, a capital offense, in violation 
5 of Utah Code section 76-5-202(1)(f). The charge is that, by 
6 the undersigned, Scott L. Wyatt, deputy county attorney, and 
. 7 under oath, that upon belief and information the defendant, 
8 in Cache County, Utah, committed the offense of criminal 
9 homicide, aggravated murder. The elements of that charge are 
10 that Tamra Rhinehart, on or about the 8th of July of 2003, 
11 J intentionally or knowingly caused the death of .Michael • 
12 Boudrero for pecuniary gain. That is the third amended 
13 information charging a single count of aggravated murder, 
14 criminal homicide. 
15' Now, then, if the clerk will administer the oath to the 
• • # • 
*f 
jl6 defendant. 
17 TAMRA RHINEHART, 
18 being first duly sworn, was examined and 
19 testified as follows: 
20 THE COURT: The record will reflect that the 
21 defendant has been put under oath. Any preliminary matters, 
22 Mr. Wyatt or Ms. Corporon, before I conduct colloquy? 
2 3 MS. CORPORON: No, Your Honor. 
24 MR. WYATT: No. 
25 
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1 EXAMINATION 
2 BY THE COURT: 
3 Q. Ms. Rhinehart, I just read to you the third amended-
4 information. I need you to answer affirmatively into the 
5 microphone. Did you understand the charge which I just read 
6 to you? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Were there any questions in your mind as to the elements 
9 of that charge? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. You understand the crime with which you've been charged? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. I'm going to read some things and then ask you a number 
14 of questions, which I'd ask you to answer audibly. This is-
15 the time set for your change of plea in this case, State of 
16 Utah versus Tamra Rhinehart. 
17 I note that you are present, as is your counsel, Mary 
18 Corporon. Scout. Williams is not present. First, I want to 
19 ask you, with respect to Mr. Williams, you recognize that you 
20 have the right, by appointment of this court, to two defense 
21 attorneys throughout the proceedings. Heretofore Mr. 
22 Williams and Ms. Corporon have worked together to assist you, 
23 but he's not here today. Do you affirmatively waive your 
24 right to have Mr. Williams here to assist you today? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. And that's a waiver made knowingly and voluntarily by you 
2 and because you think it is in your best interest to proceed 
3 this morning? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 THE COURT: Counsel for the state, Scott Wyatt, and 
6 Bruce Ward are present. Under Rule 11(h)(2) of the Utah 
7 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court may permit parties to 
8 disclose their plea agreements and the reasons for it. I 
•' 9 intend to do that. Any agreement needs to adequately address 
10 the interests of society, especially in relation for any pain 
.11 and loss suffered by the victims in this case. • The harm to 
12 any innocent person cannot be lightly treated and the 
13 punishment cannot be easily dismissed. • 
14 The parties have suggested a joint resolution of this 
15 case. Mr. Wyatt, you have indicated that it is a change of 
16 plea to guilty of aggravated murder as now charged under the 
17 third amended information. The state will not seek against. 
18 the defendant the death penalty. Is that correct, Mr. Wyatt? 
19 MR. WYATT: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: Ms. Corporon, you've indicated that 
21 based upon this condition Ms. Rhinehart is willing to plead 
22 guilty and have her sentence determined by this court in a 
23 future sentencing hearing. Is that correct? 
24 MS. CORPORON: That is my understanding, Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: I will address further her right to a 
1-27 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1 jury in regard to that matter, but as far as this matter is . 
2 concerned right now, at this point, it's' her intent to enter 
3 a plea of guilty and have the sentence determined by the 
4 court, not a jury? 
5 MS. CORPORON: That's my understanding, Your Honor, 
6 yes. 
7 THE COURT: The court finds the recommendation, 
8 based upon the information at this point received, as being 
9 acceptable. The defendant has been sworn and is now under 
10 oath. 
11 Q. (BY THE COURT) Ms. Rhinehart, the purpose of this 
12 hearing is for' you to enter a plea of guilty to the state's 
13 charge against you. In order to do so it is vital that you 
14 understand, everything that is going on and everything that I 
15 will be explaining to you. If you do not understand anything 
16 or something that I tell you, I will try to explain it to you 
17 in a clear fashion. Or I will let you talk to counsel at any 
18 time about what we're discussing. Do you understand that? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Ms. Rhinehart, how old are you? 
21 A. 46. 
22 Q. And how far did you go in school? 
23 A. Eleventh grade. 
24 Q. And can you read and write the English language? 
25 A. Yes. 
i -%/n 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. 
oth 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Ms. Rhinehart, have you taken any alcohol or drugs or any 
er medication within the last 48 hours? • 
Just my prescriptions. 
What is that? 
Lexapro. 
And what is that for? . 
Depression. 
Does that medicine in any way affect your ability tg>. 
understand what you're doing here today by pleading guilty? 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Are you confident that you are in complete control of • 
your mental faculties and able to understand these 
proceedings? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Do you currently, as far as you know, have any mental, 
emotional or physical problems or disabilities which would 
interfere with your ability to understand what is happening 
here today? 
A. No. 
Q. Has anyone forced, threatened or coerced you in any way 
to enter into this guilty plea? 
A. No. 
Q. Has anyone made any promises to you in connection with 
your guilty plea other than those contained in the plea 
agreement? 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Have you read that plea agreement? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Do you understand each and all of its terms and 
5 provisions? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Are there any which are unclear to you? 
8 A. No. . . 
9 Q. Are you in fact entering this guilty plea of your own 
10 free will and choice? . . . 
11 A. Yes. . " . . ' 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Wyatt, has the family of the victim' 
13 in this case been fully informed of the contents of the plea 
14 agreement and notified of this hearing? 
15 • MR. WYATT: They have. And they're here present. . 
16 THE COURT: I have mentioned that the plea agreement 
17 is that the defendant will plead as charged to the third 
18 amended information, criminal homicide, aggravated murder. 
19 And that the option of the death penalty is not any more to 
20 be considered, but in fact the only consideration relative to 
21 sentence before the court will be either life with parole or . 
22 life without, parole in the Utah State Prison, is that 
23 correct?. 
24 MR. WYATT: That is correct. 
25 THE COURT: That is the entirety of the agreement, 
/3o 
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1 | with the addition of dismissal of the other charges under the 
2 | second amended information? 
MR. WYATT: That's correct. 
4 | THE COURT: Ms. Corporon, is that your full 
5 I understanding of the agreement? 
6 | MS. CORPORON: That is my understanding. 
.7 IQ. (BY THE COURT) Ms. Rhinehart, is that your understanding 
of the agreement? 
A. Yes. 
10 I Q. . Ms.. Rhinehart, have you had an opportunity to thoroughly 
11 discuss this plea agreement with your attorneys? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Do you understand the terms and provisions of the' plea 
14 agreement? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Does the plea agreement represent in its entirety the 
17 understanding that you have with the State of Utah? 
18 I A. Yes. 
19 Q. Has anyone made any other promises or assurances of any 
20 kind to you in an effort to convince you to plead guilty? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Other than as stated by Mr. Wyatt in my question just a 
23 moment ago, have any.other additional charges been dismissed, 
24 or have' you been promised that any additional charges will be 
25 dismissed, as a result of this plea agreement? 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Other than as stated by Mr. Wyatt., have you been promised 
3 that additional charges will not filed in exchange for this 
4 plea agreement? Are. there any other charges out there, Mr. 
5 Wyatt, that you would otherwise intend to file but have • 
6 agreed not to? . 
7 MR". WYATT: No, Your Honor. There is nothing else . 
8 that's pending that we are aware of or that is part of this 
9 agreement. 
10 Q. (BY THE COURT) Ms. Rhinehart, in the single count of the 
11 third amended information you have been charged with the 
12 offense of aggravated murder, which is classified as a 
13 capital felony under the laws of the state of Utah. The 
14 possible penalties that attach to the offense are death, life 
15 in prison without parole, or an indeterminate prison term of 
16 not less than 20 years and which may be for life. Do you 
17 understand that these are the possible penalties that attach 
18 to.the offense of aggravated murder? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. The state has stipulated, and the court agrees, that the 
21 death penalty will not be a penalty option in this case. Is 
22 that likewise your understanding of the plea agreement? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Ms. Rhinehart, you have been charged as a party to the 
25 offense of aggravated murder. This.means that although you 
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1 did not directly cause the death of Michael Boudrero, you 
2 nevertheless acted with the mental state required for the 
3 commission of the aggravated murder. And either solicited, 
4 requested, commanded, encouraged or intentionally aided other 
5 another person, namely Craig Nicholls, to engage in conduct 
6 which constituted the offense of aggravated murder. 
7 Under the laws of the state of Utah, as a party to the 
8 offense of aggravated murder, you can be held criminally 
9 liable for this offense. Do you understand that you can be 
10 held criminally liable for the offense of aggravated murder, 
11 even though you did not directly cause the death of Mr. 
12 Michael Boudrero? 
13 A. Yes. 
.14 Q. The elements of the offense as has been charged against 
15 I you in the amended information is as follows. First, as a 
16 party to the offense you either solicited, requested, 
17 commanded, encouraged or intentionally, aided Craig Nicholls 
18 in causing the death of Michael Boudrero. Two, or second, 
19 the death of Michael Boudrero was caused intentionally or 
20 knowingly. And, third, the homicide was committed either, 
21 one, while Mr.. Nicholls was engaged in the commission of or 
22 an attempt to commit, or- flight after committing or 
23 attempting to commit aggravated robbery, robbery, aggravated 
24 kidnapping or kidnapping. Two, for pecuniary or other 
25 personal gain. Three, you engaged or employed Mr. Nicholls 
/33 
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1 to commit the homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract 
2 for remuneration, or the' promise of remuneration, for the 
3 commission of the homicide. 
4 Do you understand that these are the' elements of the 
5 offense of aggravated murder as has been charged against you? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Ms. Rhinehart, do you also understand that if you choose 
8 not to plead guilty the state would bear' the burden of 
.9 proving in a trial each of the foregoing elements of this 
10 offense beyond a resonable doubt? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. If the state should fail to establish even one of the 
13 elements of aggravated murder beyond a. reasonable doubt you 
14 would be found not guilty of the offense. Do you understand 
15 that? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. You have discussed entering this plea with your 
18 attorneys? . 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Have you had adequate opportunity • to' spend time with your 
21 attorneys so that they could answer your questions? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Have your attorneys answered all of your questions? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Are you fully satisfied with the counsel, representation 
/3¥ 
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1 | and advice you've received, and which has been given to you, 
2 I by your attorneys? 
3 I A. Yes. 
4 | Q. Do you need additional time.to confer with your. 
5 I attorneys, specifically Ms. Corporon, this morning? 
6 A. No. 
Q. Ms. Rhinehart, have you had a chance to read the plea 
agreement, as I asked you earlier, in its entirety? 
A. Yes. 
10 I Q. Have you gone over that plea agreement with your 
111 attorneys? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Have your attorneys reviewed with you the elements of the 
14 offense of aggravated murder, as has been charged against 
15 you, and the possible penalties attached to this offense as 
16 set.forth in the plea agreement? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 J Q. Have you been made aware of the evidence the state would 
19 present against you in this case if it went to trial? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Based upon the evidence the state would introduce at 
22 trial,, do you believe that there is a substantial, chance that 
23' if the jury believed the state's evidence you would, be found 
24 guilty of aggravated murder? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Have your attorneys reviewed with you the rights which 
2 are set for in the plea agreement? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. To you need more time this morning to talk to your 
5 attorney about the plea agreement itself? 
6 A. No." 
7 THE COURT: Ms. Corporon, have you reviewed the 
8 evidence in this matter and reviewed the evidence as relates 
9 to the elements of the offense charged? 
10 MS. CORPORON: Exhaustively, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Do you believe that a factual basis 
12 exists for this plea? 
13 MS. CORPORON: I do. 
14 THE COURT: Do you believe' that there's a 
15 substantial chance that your client would be convicted of the 
16 offense of aggravated murder if this matter went to trial? 
17 MS. CORPORON: I do, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Have you gone over the plea agreement 
19 with your client and explained the rights she will give up by 
20 entering this plea? 
21 , MS. CORPORON: I have. \ 
22 THE COURT: And do you believe that your client 
23 understands the contents of the plea agreement, the plea . 
24 statement, and the constitutional rights which are waived as 
25 a result of this guilty plea? 
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1 MS. CORPORON: Yes, Your Honor. Let me again state 
2 for.the record that Mr. Williams is not present today, but 
3 Mr. Williams has also reviewed the evidence in this' case •' 
4 exhaustively and has gone through the evidence with myself 
5 and with the defendant. He has reviewed the .statement in 
6 advance of plea. He has also reviewed the concept of this 
7 whole plea agreement with the defendant prior to todayTs 
8 hearing. Though he cannot be here now, he's participated 
9 fully in all of those things you just asked me about up until 
10 today's hearing.. I believe he would answer the questions you. 
11 just asked me the same as I've answered them. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you for that statement. 
13 Q. (BY THE COURT) Ms. Rhinehart, I want to explain to you 
14 certain rights that you have in this matter. I want to find 
15 out whether you understand those rights. Again, these are 
16 likely repeated in the statement itself, but I'm going to 
17 review those with you now as part of our discussion. Please 
.18. listen carefully to what I tell you and to my questions and 
19 be sure to let me know, if there's anything you do' not 
20 understand. And if you need to talk to your attorney you may 
21 do so either here or in private. 
22 One, you have the right to plead not guilty in this' 
23 matter and to maintain that plea of not guilty. And you have 
24 the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial and 
25 unbiased jury. Do you understand this? 
/S 7 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Two, although you have the right to be tried by a jury, 
3 you may also have a judge decide your case instead of a jury 
4 if the prosecution and the judge agreed to that. If the 
5 judge were to decide your case, the judge would also have to 
6 be impartial and unbiased.. Do you understand that? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Three, do you understand that if you have a trial you 
9 have the right to be represented by an attorney, actually two 
10 attorneys in this case. And if you could not afford the 
11 attorneys they would be appointed to represent you, as ITve 
12. already done, at no cost to you. Do you understand that? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Four, it is my understanding that you have not waived 
15 your right to counsel and your attorneys continue to be Ms. 
16 Corporon and Mr. Williams. Is that true? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q-. Five, if you do not plead guilty, you are presumed to be 
19 innocent until the state proves that you are guilty of 
20 aggravated murder. If you choose to fight this charge 
21 against you, you need only plead not guilty and your case 
22 will go to trial as scheduled. Do you understand that? 
23 A. Yes. 
2 4 Q. Do you understand that if a trial were to be held, the 
25 state would have the burden of overcoming the presumption of 
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innocence and you would have no obligation to prove your 
innocence because you are presumed to be innocent? You 
understand that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Seven, do you understand that if a trial was held the 
state would have to prove each of the elements of the offense 
of aggravated murder beyond a reasonable doubt before you 
could be found guilty of the offense? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Eight, if a trial were held before a jury the verdict 
would have to be unanimous, meaning that each juror would 
have to find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before you 
could be convicted. Do you understand that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Nine, do you understand that' by pleading guilty you give 
up the presumption of innocence' and you will be admitting to. 
the crime of aggravated murder? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Ten, you have an absolute right to remain silent. You 
cannot be compelled to incriminate yourself or provide 
evidence against you. An incriminating statement is a 
statement which would tend to connect you.with the commission 
of the crime. Do you understand that you have an absolute 
right -to remain silent and you cannot be made to incriminate 
yourself? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Eleven, in addition, if you choose to remain silent your 
silence cannot be. used against you at trial and the jurors 
would be told that they cannot hold your decision not to 
testify against you. Do you understand this? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Twelve, do you understand that a plea of guilty is an 
admission of all of the facts which are necessary to 
establish your guilt at trial? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Thirteen, because a plea of guilty admits all the facts 
necessary to establish guilt, it is an incriminating 
statement. Do you understand that by entering a plea of 
guilty you give up your right to remain silent? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Fourteen, although you have the right to remain silent, 
if you were to have a trial you would have the right to 
testify in your own behalf if you wished to do so. Do you 
understand that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Fifteen, if you were to have a trial you would have the 
right to confront and cross-examine any witness which may 
confront you at trial. This means that your attorneys would 
be able to ask each witness questions while the witness is in 
open court and in your presence and under oath. Do you 
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1 understand you have that right? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Sixteen, you also have the right to present evidence and 
4 to compel witnesses to appear in court to testify for you. 
5 This means that you'd be entitled to obtain subpoenas 
6 requiring the attendance and the testimony of those 
7 witnesses. And that if you could not afford to pay the 
8 witnesses to appear the state would pay those costs. Do you 
9 understand that you have that right? . 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Seventeen, do you understand that a plea of guilty 
12 establishes your guilt and permits sentencing to go forward 
13 without first going through the guilt and innocence phase of 
14 the trial? 
15 A. Yes . . ' " . . - • ' 
16 Q. Eighteen, if a judge or a jury were to find you guilty, 
17 you would have the right to appeal your conviction'to the 
18 Utah Supreme Court.. In addition, you would have the right to 
19 an attorney to assist you in preparing your appeal. And if 
20 you could not afford the costs of an appeal the state would 
21 pay the cost for you. However, when you enter a plea of 
22 guilty you admit your own guilt. Having admitted your guilt 
23 in court, you cannot contest your own statement of guilt on 
24 appeal. Do you understand that? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Nineteen, do you understand that by entering a plea of 
2 guilty you give up all of the rights we just discussed, as 
3 well as those rights set forth in the plea statement? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Ms. Rhinehart, by pleading guilty to aggravated murder, 
6 further proceedings must be held to address the issue of what 
7 sentence you should receive. The sentencing hearing, or 
8 penalty phase of the trial, is an adversarial proceeding and 
9 many of the aforementioned rights we discussed, the right to 
10 counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to testify, 
11 the right to call witnesses in your behalf, the right to 
12 cross-examine, are rights which apply to a sentencing . 
13 hearing. You also have the right, if you so choose, to make 
14 an unsworn statement concerning punishment that is not . 
15 subject to cross-examination. Do you understand that right? 
16 A. Yes. " • - . . -
17 Q. In light of your plea .agreement with the state, the death 
18 penalty will not be a sentencing option. This means that the 
19 penalties you face are, one, life in prison without parole; 
20 or, two, an indeterminate prison term of not less than 20 
21 years and which may be for life. 
22 At the sentencing hearing both aggravating and mitigating 
23 evidence will be presented relating ~o.the nature and 
24 circumstances of your crime, your character, background, 
25 history, mental and physical condition, and the impact of 
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1 your crime upon the victim's family. The state will' 
2 introduce the aggravating evidence, which is evidence to show 
3 that a sentence of life in prison without parole is the 
4 appropriate penalty in your case. You and your attorneys 
5 will have the right to introduce mitigating evidence, which 
6 is evidence tending to show that a sentence of life in prison 
7 without parole should not be imposed. Do you understand 
8 that? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Under the laws of the state of Utah, a sentence of life 
11 in prison without parole can only be imposed if, after 
12 considering all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence 
13 presented, the court concludes that a sentence of life in 
14 prison without parole is appropriate. The burden of 
15 establishing that a sentence of life without parole is always 
16 upon the state. Do you understand that? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Ms. Rhinehart, in addition to facing the aforementioned 
19 penalty you may also be ordered to make restitution to any 
20 victims of the crime. Do you understand that? 
21 A. Yes. . 
22 Q. After you plead guilty, if you later desire to withdraw 
23 your plea of guilty you must file a written motion to 
24 withdraw your plea before sentence is announced. You will 
25 only be allowed to withdraw your plea with permission of the 
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1 court and by showing that your plea was not knowingly and 
. 2 voluntarily made. Do you understand that? ' 
3 A. Yes. 
4 I Q. Up to this point is there anything that you do not 
. 5 understand about this proceeding or about the plea in this 
6 case? 
• 7 A. No. 
8 Q. Is there anything you would like to ask me or your 
9 attorney before I accept your plea? 
10 A. No. 
11 THE COURT: Now, ordinarily I ask the prosecutor to 
12 tell me what happened in this case.. I understand that those 
13 facts are set forth in the statement, Mr. Wyatt, is that 
14 correct? 
15 MR. WYATT: That's correct. 
16 Q. (BY THE COURT) When I read that I want you to listen 
17 very carefully because I'm going to ask you everything about 
18 those facts and If in fact they are true. If there's 
19 anything in that statement relative to the facts of this case 
20 which you do not believe .is true, I want you to tell me. Do 
21 you understand that? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Ms. Rhin.ehart, do you feel that it is in your best 
24 interest to enter a plea of guilty in this-case rather than 
25 going to trial? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. You have previously entered a plea of not guilty to the 
3 offense of aggravated murder. At this point do you wish to 
4 withdraw that plea of not guilty? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. What plea do you intend to enter to the charge of 
•7 aggravated murder, capital homicide, at this point? 
8 A.. Guilty. 
9 Q. Ms. Rhinehart, after I review the plea statement with 
10 you, we're going to set a sentencing date, assuming you enter 
11 I a plea at that time. Ordinarily the penalty phase in a 
12 capital trial is conducted before a jury, unless a request is 
13 made by the defendant to waive the jury and have the court 
14 determine the appropriate penalty. If such a request is . 
15 made, which I understand it is made at this point in time, is 
16 that correct? 
17 MS. CORPORON: Yes, Your Honor. 
18 Q. (BY THE COURT) The prosecution must also give its 
19 consent and finally the court must grant its approval. It is 
20 my understanding that you wish to waive the jury for 
21 sentencing and request your sentencing hearing be conducted 
22 before the court. Is that correct? 
23 A. Yes . 
24 THE COURT: Mr, Wyatt, is it the state's intent to 
25 consent to have the sentencing proceed in this case conducted 
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1 before the court only? 
2 MR. WYATT: Yes . 
3 THE COURT: And, Ms. Corporon, that's your intent 
• 4 likewise? 
5 MS, CORPORON: Yes. 
6 Q. (BY THE COURT) Now, directing your attention to the 
7 sentencing statement, do you. have a copy of that before you, 
8 Ms. Rhinehart? 
9 A. Yes, 
10 Q. I'm going to review this in its entirety with you.' It 
11 starts off by indicating that you hereby certify that you've 
12 been advised of and understand the facts and your rights as 
13 contained herein; and that you have had the assistance of 
14 counsel in reviewing and understanding this form. 
15 Beginning with paragraph number one, the nature of the 
16 charge against me to which I have agreed to plead guilty is 
17 aggravated murder, a capital felony, in violation of 
18 76-5-202(1)(f),1953 as amended. I have had the opportunity 
19 to discuss the nature of the charge with my attorneys. I 
20 understand the charge and the elements that the government is 
21 required to prove. Do you understand that, is that true? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Paragraph two, I understand that the elements of the 
24 charge of aggravated murder are that I intentionally and 
25 knowingly caused the death of Michael Boudrero for the 
/H 
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1 purpose of pecuniary gain. I understand that Utah law 
2 provides that every person acting with the mental state 
3 required for the commission of an offense who directly 
4 commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
5 encourages or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
6 conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally 
7 liable as a party for such conduct. I further understand 
8 that a plea of guilty is an admission to all of these 
9 elements. Ms. Rhinehart, is- that true? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Three., I know that the maximum possible penalty provided 
12 for by law for a conviction of aggravated murder, under the-. 
13 terms of this plea, is imprisonment for life without 
14 possibility of parole and a fine or-both. I know that the 
15 minimum possible sentence under this plea is an indeterminate 
•16 prison term of not less than 20 years and which may be for 
17 life. I further understand that the sentence can be 
18 consecutive to the sentence I'm currently serving. 
19 A. Yes. 
20 THE COURT: The last sentence there, Mr. Wyatt, I 
21 further understand that this sentence can be consecutive to 
22 the sentence I'm currently serving, is there a sentence she's 
23 currently serving?. 
24 MS. CORPORON: She's currently on probation, Your 
25 Honor. There's a sentence imposed or may be. I think that's 
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1 a reference to that possibility. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. WYATT: That was the burglary trial, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: That's right. . I'm sorry. I forgot that 
5 we concluded that. We were going to originally reserve it. 
6 I We did conclude it. Thank you. 
7 Q. (BY THE COURT) Four, I know that I can be represented by 
8 an attorney at every stage of this proceeding. And I know if 
9 I cannot afford an attorney'one will be appointed to 
10 represent me. I am in fact being represented by Ms. Mary C. 
11 Corporon and Scott Williams. Is thai: true?. 
12 A. Yes.. 
13 Q. Five, I know that I have the right to plead not guilty. 
14 I know that I have entered a plea of not guilty and I can' 
15 continue to persist in that plea. . Is that true? . 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Six, I know I have the right to a speedy public trial by 
18 an impartial jury. In fact,: I presently have a jury trial 
19 scheduled beginning April 7, 2005. I know that if I were to 
20 stand trial by a jury, A, I have the right to the presumption 
21 of innocence. . 3, I have the right to the assistance of two 
22 qualified counsel at every stage of the.proceedings. C, I 
23 have the.right to see and observe the witnesses who testify 
24 against me. D, my attorneys can cross-examine, in open 
25 court, all witnesses who testify against me. E, I can call 
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1 such witnesses as I desire and I can obtain subpoenas to 
2 require, the attendance and testimony of these witnesses. If 
3 I cannot afford to pay the witness and the mileage fees of 
4 those witnesses, the government will pay them for me. 
5 F, I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do not 
6 have to testify at my trial. Whether or not I testify is my 
7 decision made, in consultation with my attorneys. G, if I do 
8 not testify the jury will be told that no inference adverse 
9 to me may be drawn from my failure to testify. 
10 H, the government must prove each and every element of 
11 the offense' charged against me beyond a reasonable doubt. I, 
12 it requires a unanimous verdict of a' jury of 12 to convict 
13 me. J, if I were to be convicted I can appeal. And if I 
14 cannot afford to appeal the government will pay the costs of 
15 appeal, including the services of two appointed counsel. 
16 I am freely, voluntarily and knowingly waiving all of the 
17 foregoing rights. Is that true, Ms. Rhinehart? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Seven, I know that a plea — excuse me. I know that 
20 under a plea of guilty there will not be a trial of any kind. 
21 I will not have a jury hearing of any kind. The sentence 
22 will be imposed by the.assigned judge herein. You understand 
23 that to be true? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Eight, I understand that by pleading guilty there will be 
;<£<=? 
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1 no appellate review of any lawful sentence imposed. I know I 
2 may appeal the sentence imposed under this plea of guilty 
3] only in the following circumstances. A, if the sentence was 
4 imposed in violation of the law. B, if the sentence was a 
5 result of.an incorrect application of sentencing law. Or, C, 
6 if the sentence is greater than the law allows as to fine or 
7 imprisonment; or is greater than the sentence specified in 
8 this agreement. Do you understand that to be true? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Number nine, I represent that the following facts 
11 regarding the charge I am pleading guilty to are true and 
12 correct, or that I do not dispute the facts referenced below 
13 for which I do not have personal knowledge. A, in early 2003 
14 I became acquainted with my co-defendant, Mr. Craig Nicholls. 
15 B, in 2003 I made statements to Mr. Nicolls which he 
16 understood and interpreted as a request on my part for him to 
17 murder my former husband, Michael Boudrero. C, Michael 
18 Boudrero was murdered by shooting in Cache County, Utah,' in 
19 j July of 2003. D, I was not present at the time of the 
20 shooting of Michael Boudrero, but I am informed and believe, • 
21 by reason of my prior conversations with Mr. Nicholls and by 
22 reason of Mr. Nicholls's subsequent statements, that he is 
23 the person.who shot Michael Boudrero and that Mr. Nicholls 
24 did so at my request and instigation. I intended the death 
25 of Michael Boudrero to occur by the following circumstances. 
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1 MR. WYATT: Excuse me.. Foregoing circumstances. 
2 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Thank you. E, I was 
3 therefore a party accomplice to the murder of Michael 
4 Boudrero. ' F, I made efforts to obtain a life insurance 
5 policy or policies on the life of Michael Boudrero and 
6 intended that I may -- excuse me. I or my minor children 
7 would receive the life insurance benefits and/or Social 
8 Security benefits upon the death of Michael Boudrero. 
9 Ms. Rhinehart, is all of that true? 
10 A. . Yes. 
11 Q. Your answer is yes? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Number 10, the only terms and conditions contained in 
14 this plea agreement between me and the state are as follows. 
15 .A, I will plead guilty to count one of the information, 
16 aggravated murder. B, the state agrees to dismiss the 
17 remaining counts in the information. ' C, the state agrees 
18 that it will not seek, and specifically is withdrawing its 
19 I request, to impose a death penalty.- The court will not 
20 impose a death penalty. D, pursuant to Utah law, I agree I 
21 will serve a period of incarceration for this offense of 
22 either life without the possibility of parole; or an 
23 indeterminate prison term of not less than 20 years and which 
24 may be for life, to be determined by the- assigned judge 
25 herein at an evidentiary sentencing hearing. I understand 
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1 that at this hearing I may produce testimony and evidence in 
2 support of life, and that the state will produce testimony 
3 and evidence in support of a sentence of life without 
4 possibility of parole. Is that true? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Number 11, I have the right to ask the court any 
7 questions I wish to ask concerning my rights and about these 
8 proceedings and the plea. Do you understand that to be true? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Do you have any questions you want to ask at this point? 
11 A. N o . • 
12 Q. 12, I make the following representations to the court. 
13 A, I'm 46 years of age. My education is high school. I can 
14 read and understand the English language. B, no threats or 
15 promises of any sort have been made to me to. induce or 
16 persuade me to enter this plea, other than the 
17 representations of the plea agreement and the provisions 
18 contained herein. C, no one has told me I will receive 
19 probation or any other form of special leniency because of my 
20 plea. D, ITve discussed this case and the plea with my 
21 lawyers as much as I wish too. E, I'm satisfied with my 
22 lawyers, Mary Corporon and Scott Williams. F, my decision to 
23 enter this plea was made after'full and careful thought,• with 
24 the advice of counsel, and a full understanding of my 
25 constitutional, trial,, and appeal rights, with a full • 
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1 understanding of the evidence the state would adduce at trial 
2 in the case, and with a full understanding of the 
3 consequences of this plea. I was not under the influence of 
4 any drugs, medications or intoxicants when the decision to 
5 enter this plea was made and I am not now under the influence 
6 of any drugs, medications•or intoxicants. 
7 Is that true with the exception of the medication you 
8 earlier indicated, Ms. Rhinehart?. 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And it's also true that you believe that the medication 
11 which you identified, does not adversely affect your ability 
12 to understand these proceedings, is that true? 
13 A. Yes. 
1,4 Q. Thirteen, I understand that I have- the right to file a 
15 motion to withdraw this plea of guilty only if made prior to 
.16 sentence being imposed. Such a motion, if made, will not 
17 automatically be granted and will be granted only upon leave 
18 of the court and a showing that my plea of guilty was not 
19 maid knowingly and voluntarily. Is that.true? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Fourteen, I have no mental reservations concerning this 
22 plea. Is that also true? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Wyatt, are there any other questions 
25 which you want to address to the defendant in support of a 
/S3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 32 
1 finding by this court that the plea is made knowingly, 
2 voluntarily, intentionally and intelligently? 
3 MR. WYATT: We have no further questions. Thank 
4 you. 
5 THE COURT: . Ms. Corporon, is there.any question 
6 which you think has not been addressed or any issue which you 
7 think needs to be addressed before the court accepts her 
8 plea? 
9 MS. CORPORON: No, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: I will ask you each, Mr. Wyatt and Ms. 
11 Corporon, to. first countersign the plea agreement as it.has 
12 been given to me. 
13 MS. CORPORON: Your Honor. I think first the 
14 defendant should probably sign the document. • 
15 THE COURT: That's fine. I just want a 
16 certification from each of you that this plea, as far as you 
17 know, is being made knowingly and voluntarily. 
18 Q. (BY THE COURT) Ms. Rhinehart, I'll ask you to sign the 
19 statement, and by doing so I instruct you that you do so with 
20 a' full understanding of its contents, the import of the 
21 contents of the same, and that this is made knowingly and 
22 freely and voluntarily by you, is. that true? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 THE COURT: All right. 
25 MS. CORPORON: The record should reflect that Ms. 
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1 Rhinehart has just executed the statement in advance of plea 
2 in open court just now before Your Honor. I've also signed 
3 the certificate as defense counsel. 
4 THE COURT: The copy which you have, I assume, is an 
5 exact copy from which I've been reading? 
6 . MS. CORPORON: Yes, Your Honor, I believe so. 
7 MR. WYATT: May the record reflect that I've just 
8 executed the same document. 
9 THE COURT: The record will reflect that in open 
10 court Tamra Rhinehart singed, the document. . It has been 
11 countersigned by Mary Corporon. The signature.line for Mr. 
12 Williams is not signed since he's not present here today in 
13 court. 
14 , To the charge, then, Ms. Rhinehart, of aggravated murder, 
15 criminal homicide, a capital offense, in violation of 
16 76-5-202. of the Utah Code, sub one, sub F, as I've read and 
17 we have discussed that this morning regarding the death of 
18 Mr. Michael Boudrero, how do you plead? 
19 MS. RHINEHART: Guilty. 
20 THE COURT: Based upon the plea statement and the' 
21 court's discussion and colloquy with the defendant, and 
22 observation of Ms. Rhinehart, this court finds that Ms. 
23 Rhinehart has entered a plea of guilty knowingly and 
24 voluntarily, with full knowledge of her rights. The court 
25 also finds that Ms. Rhinehart understands the nature and 
/SS~ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 34 
1 elements of. the offense to which she's pleaded and the 
2 relationship between the facts of this case and the elements 
3 of the offense charged. Finally, this court finds that the 
4 state has proffered evidence it believes is sufficient to 
5 form a factual basis for the plea of guilty. 
6 Based upon such the court, knowing those things, accepts 
7 the defendant's plea of guilty as charged in count one of the 
8 third amended information. 
9 Ms. Rhinehart, it is necessary at'this point for the 
10 court to set a date for a sentencing hearing. Ordinarily the 
11 penalty phase in a capital case is. conducted before a jury, 
12 as we discussed earlier. That jury will not be here because. 
13 you have waived the right to a jury. The sentencing phase 
14 will be conducted by this' court alone. 
15 Mr. Wyatt, you specifically, on behalf of the state, 
16 consent to the sentencing phase being conducted by the court 
17 without a jury? 
18 MR. WYATT: That's correct. 
19 THE COURT: Ms. Corporon, you likewise consent? 
20 ' MS. CORPORON: Yes, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: The court will grant its approval that 
22 the sentencing of in this case will be conducted before the 
23 court. Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
24 Procedure,' the matter needs to be set for sentencing in not 
25 less than two nor more than 45 days, unless the . defendant 
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1 agrees to waive the time. How much hearing time will be 
2 required? 
3 MR. WYATT: The state, would request that the court 
4 reserve three hours for us. 
5 MS. CORPORON: I think, Your Honor, we need more 
6 time. There is some material that we would need to present. 
7 We may not need a couple of days, but I ask that we. reserve a 
8 couple of days. 
9 THE COURT: Before I set that date, I think it would 
10 be advisable for this .court to receive from Adult Probation 
11 and Parole- a presentence report. 
12 MS. CORPORON: Your Honor, if I could respond to 
13 that, as the court is well aware from what the court has 
14 executed in terms of authorizing orders for defense experts 
15 in this case, we've had a mitigation expert and several . 
16 investigators working on this matter. That mitigation expert 
17 has been working since the summer of 2003, actually, late 
18 summer of 2003., and has substantial material. 
19 I would suggest, Your Honor, that what we would have to 
20 present would be much more exhaustive regarding this 
21 defendant, her history,•her life circumstances, than what I 
22 have ever seen in. a standard felony presentence 
23 investigation. That it would be surplusage. I think we 
24 would begin to run into questions of whether, in order to 
25 enable the pretrial officer to do his or her job, whether we 
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1 ought to turn that material, which is extremely voluminous, 
2 over to them. I'd suggest that in this particular case, 
3 J under these unique circumstances, a presentence report is 
4 surplusage. 
5 THE COURT: There's a procedural purpose for a. 
6 presentence report having to do with the procedures and 
7 operating — the operating procedures of the Department of 
8 Corrections. Mr. Wyatt, I'll ask you to respond. I've also 
9 invited Ms. Hoxey to be here from the Department of 
10 Corrections relative to this issue. 
11 I agree, Ms. Corporon, I don't want to- have the 
12 Department of Corrections simply duplicate and extend their 
13 efforts by way of surplusage. On the other hand, there may 
14 be some things that, without duplicating everything your 
15 mitigating investigator has already done, may be beneficial 
1 6 to the court. 
17 MR. WYATT: Your Honor, the state concurs. We would 
18- concur with the court's indication that you would like a 
19 presentence report.-' We would appreciate 'a presentence report 
20 as well. I think that in a case like this, where the 
21 sentence is as significant as.it is, we ought to do 
22 everything we can to get as much information to the court. 
2 3 THE COURT: Ms. Hoxey, if I may ask you to respond 
24 to this, in deference to Ms. Corporon's concern relative to 
25 surplusage and duplication of effort, I assume, by way of 
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1 policy, that the Department of Corrections is in a position 
2 to prepare such a report? 
3 MS. HOXEY: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: Can you do so in consultation with Ms. 
5 Corporon so that in fact your efforts can be minimized but 
6 still -fulfill your procedural requirements? 
7 MS. HOXEY: I feel like we can meet all the 
8 requirements and also get the information to make sure that 
9 you have all the information available. 
10 'MS. CORPORON: I guess that's one of the problems 
11 that I have, Your Honor. What I have right now is work 
12 product. It's confidential information. I wish to be --
13 THE COURT: I'm not asking to you do that. 
14 • MS. CORPORON: I wish to be able to organize that 
15 and present it to the court in an evidentiary hearing in a 
16 way most beneficial to my client. To just open everything up 
17 to someone isn't what I'm seeking to do. 
18 THE COURT: I'm going to ask Ms. Hoxey to be 
19 sensitive to that and prepare what she can. If you have an 
20 objection to it because it is work product or because you 
.21 think it would be better presented in the hearing, I'll defer 
22 to that. • 
23 : MS. CORPORON: Thank you, Your Honor. At the time 
24 of the hearing I'm going to be asking to append a mitigation 
25 report and whatever findings this court makes to the 
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1 presentence report, because I do understand that a 
2 presentence report goes into the prison and determines, among 
3 other things, custodial status and action of the Board, if 
4 any. 
5 THE COURT: That's right. I would invite that. Ms.. 
6 Hoxey, to that extent, tailoring your usual procedures with 
7 those concerns in mind I'm going to ask you to prepare a 
8 report. 
9 Now, then, let's talk about a time frame. We have some 
10 time, obviously --
11 MS. CORPORON: May Ms. Rhinehart be seated, Your 
12 Honor? 
13 THE COURT: Yes, certainly. We have some time, 
14 obviously, already set aside between the 7th of April and the 
15 J 4th of May. That may be too soon. I'm seeking the advice of 
16 counsel about that. I would like to put it there. I assume 
17 that Ms. Corporon already has her material gathered? 
18 MS. CORPORON: My client has just asked if she could 
19 be excused from the courtroom. I think since all we're doing 
20 is scheduled a hearing at this point it's not a critical 
21 stage of the proceedings. 
22 THE COURT: It only is if we schedule it outside the-
23 45 days. It is my intent to try and do it within; the 45 
24 days. Otherwise it would require her agreement. 
25 MS. CORPORON: I believe she would at this time 
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1 agree to any scheduling that works with her counsel and with 
2 the court in this matter. I believe she would agree to waive 
3 the 45 days if thatfs what is necessary for us to be able to 
4 present our case the way that we hope to be able to do. If 
5 the court could take that waiver from her now, she's asked, if 
6 she could be excused. 
7 THE COURT: Ms. Rhinehart, is that in fact your 
8 waiver? Do. you agree with the statement just made by Ms. 
9 Corporon? 
10 MS. RHINEHART: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: All right. . You may be excused,-, then. 
12 •' MS. CORPORON: Thank you, Your Honor. As to the 
13 timing on this, we have several witnesses that we would want 
14 to call for sentencing. We had originally told those 
15 individuals that they would need to be necessary -- need to 
16 be available for a possible sentencing phase and told them to 
17 be available toward the end of April or the first two weeks 
18 of May. That's when they all cleared to do the Rhinehart 
19 case. A couple of them have made other plans. One in 
20 particular has three trials in which heTs supposed to testify 
21 in the first three weeks of April. 
22 THE COURT: Let me suggest, then, the 3rd and 4th of 
23 May. 
24 MS. CORPORON: Or would the 25th and 26th of April 
25 or the 28th and 29th be a possibility? 
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1 THE COURT: Certainly. 
2 MS. CORPORON: Those also work for everybody. 
3 • THE COURT: Any preference for you, Mr. Wyatt? . 
4 MR. WYATT: The 28th and 29th are fine with us. 
5 MS. CORPORON: It works well for me. I believe it 
6 also works for the people we would have to have here. 
7 THE COURT: Ms. Hoxey, thatTs a little bit shorter 
8 than usual. We're imposing upon you. But this may be a 
9 somewhat abbreviated form likewise. Is that satisfactory 
10 with the Department of Corrections? 
11 MS. HOXEY: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: 9:00, then, on the 28th of April. We'll 
13 go that day and the next day. 
14 MR. WYATT: Is that within the 45 days? 
15 THE COURT: It is. Mr. Wyatt, anything further from 
16 the state? 
17 MR. WYATT: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: Anything further from the defense? 
19 MS. CORPORON: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Court will be in 
21 recess. 
22 (Concluded at 11:55 a.m.) 
2 3 
24 
25 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the change of plea hearing was 
reported and transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a 
Certified Court Reporter in and for the State of Utah'. 
That a full, true and correct transcription of the 
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the 
pages numbered 2 to 40, inclusive.-
I further certify that the original transcript was 
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Cache 
County, Logan, Utah. 
Dated this 21st day of June, 2005. 
Rodney" MTFelshaw7"cTsTRT7"RTpTR" 
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FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
APPEALED: CASE #20050635 
STATE OF UTAH vs. TAMRA RHINEHART 
CASE NUMBER 031100633 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-5-202 - AGGRAVATED MURDER Capital (amended) to 
Capital 
Offense Date: July 08, 2003 
Plea: March 18, 2005 Guilty 
Disposition: March 18, 2005 Guilty 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
GORDON J LOW 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff- STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: N GEORGE DAINES 
Represented by: DONALD G LINTON 
Represented by: SCOTT L WYATT 
Defendant - TAMRA RHINEHART 
Represented by: ELIZABETH HUNT 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: TAMRA RHINEHART 
Date of Birth: September 05, 1958 
Law Enforcement Agency: {NORTH LOGAN POLICE} 
Prosecuting Agency: CACHE COUNTY 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 5,339.50 
Amount Paid: 5,339.50 
Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: REPORTER FEES 
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CASE NUMBER 031100633 State Felony 
04-25-05 Filed: AP&P PSI w/attachments - confidential file 
04-27-05 Filed order: Request For Still Photography In Courtroom -
approved 
Judge GORDON J LOW 
Signed April 27, 2005 
04-28-05 Notice - Final Exhibit List 
04-28-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCING 
Judge: GORDON J. LOW V 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lindald 
Reporter: FELSHAW, ROD 
Prosecutor: WYATT, SCOTT L 
, Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CORPORON, MARY C 
Tape Count: 10:29 AM 
HEARING 
COUNT: 10:29 AM 
Court in session following prior in chambers conference with 
counsel. Arty's Wyatt & Linton present for the State. Atty's 
Corporon & Williams present for the defense. Court will be in 
recess to review procedure with counsel in chambers. 
TIME: 11:39 AM Court again in session. Sentencing will proceed 
by oral victim statements to the Court. 
TIME: 12:10 PM Court in lunch recess to reconvene at 1:00 PM. 
TIME: 1:27 PM Court again in session. Atty Wyatt offers State's 
Exhibits 1 & 2. Court receives Exhibits 1 & 2. 
TIME: 1:28 PM Atty Corporon states another victim, Shea Croshaw 
desires to offer a statement. Court receives statement. 
TIME: 1:34 PM Atty Wyatt cross examines victim Shea Croshaw & 
re-direct follows. Victim was not put under oath. 
TIME: 1:37 PM Atty Williams calls Witness Steven Clegg. Witness 
Clegg sworn & direct examination conducted. 
TIME: 1:46 PM Witness Clegg cross examined. 
TIME: 1:47 PM Witness Clegg steps down. Atty Williams calls 
Witness Dayna Fair, Witness Fair sworn & direct examined. 
TIME: 1:54 PM Witness Fair steps down. Atty Corporon proffers 
testimony of Leann Careloa, Clearfield Elementary School Teacher & 
Tamra Tingey, Clearfield Elementary School Principal. Proffered 
testimony received by Court. 
TIME: 1:59 PM Defense Exhibit 1, 2 & 3 offered & received as 
sealed documents. Defendant advised of right of allocution. 
Defendant waives the right of allocution. 
TIME: 2:05 PM State calls rebuttal Witness Dr Vickie Gregory who 
is sworn & direct examined. I 
TIME: 2:27 PM Dr Gregory steps down. No further testimony by 
either side. 
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CASE NUMBER 031100633 State Felony 
TIME: 2:28 PM Atty Wyatt presents closing argument. 
TIME: 2:57 PM Atty Corporon offers closing argument. 
TIME: 3:24 PM Atty Wyatt presents rebuttal argument. 
TIME: 3:36 PM Atty Corporon offers Defense Exhibit 4. Court 
receives Exhibit 4. Court takes a brief recess. 
TIME: 4:07 PM Court again in session. Judge Low addresses the 
Court and sentences the Defendant. Defendant is ordered to serve a 
life sentence in the Utah State Prison without the possibility of 
parole. 
TIME: 4:39 PM Prison sentence ordered in case 031101017 will run 
concurrent with this case. State will prepare the Sentence, 
Judgment & Commitment. Court grants State's motion to withdraw 
State's Exhibits 1 & 2 which are returned to State's custody. 
TIME: 4:40 PM Court in recess. 
05-05-05 Filed: Transcript Request/Billing Statement (Don Linton) 
05-05-05 Filed: Subpoena (Tamra Tingey) 
05-05-05 Filed: Subpoena ( Leann Carreola) 
05-05-05 Note: SENTENCING minutes modified. 
05-09-05 Filed: Stricken/Unsigned Order Authorizing Withdrawal Of 
Counsel And Order To Appoint New Counsel 
05-09-05 Filed: Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Counsel For Purposes Of 
Appeal 
05-09-05 Filed: Transcript Of Judge's Ruling at Sentencing 4/28/05 
05-17-05 Filed: Notice Of Appeal 
05-17-05 Filed: Defendant's Objections To Presentence Report And Motion 
To Redact Objectionable Portions 
05-24-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 70.00 
05-24-05 REPORTER FEES Payment Received: 70.00 
Note: REPORTER FEES, Mail Payment; 
05-27-05 Filed: Faxed Letter Requesting Transcript of Change Of Plea 
Hearing 4/28/05 by Atty Williams 
05-31-05 Filed: Certification In Re: Transcript with attached letter 
dated 5/24/05 
06-07-05 Filed: Letter from Atty Scott Williams requesting withdrawal 
from consideration the Motion For Leave to Withdraw as Counsel 
06-09-05 Filed: Letter from Law Clerk Michael Christiansen to Atty Scott 
Wyatt regarding Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel for 
Purposes of Appeal 
06-10-05 Filed: Docketing Statement 
06-15-05 Minute Entry - Minutes tor TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
Judge: GORDON J. LOW 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lindaid 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
Prosecutor: LINTON, DONALD G 
Defendant not present 
Defendant's Attorney(s): WILLIAMS, SCOTT C 
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Rhinehart pleads guilt] 
ogan plumber's 
x-wife sidesteps 
eath penalty with 
iiirder admission 
' Tyler Riggs 
iff writer 
Tamra Rhinehart will be spared the 
ath penalty after she pleaded guilty to 
irdering her ex-husband in 1st District 
>urt on Friday. 
Rhinehart, 46, was expected to stand 
al next month in the July 2003 murder 
Logan plumber Michael Boudrero, 
t she reversed her plea of not guilty 
d will be sentenced for the capital 
fense April 28. 
Boudrero's family members said they 
>pe Rhinehart gets the same sentence 
r boyfriend and accomplice, Craig 
Local reaction — A3 
uncan Nicholls, got after he pleaded 
lilty to fatally shooting Boudrero, at 
tunehart's behest, in a North Logan 
)me: life without parole. 
"(We want her to get) life in jail with-
it any possibility of parole,', said Marl-
ine Folkman, Boudrero's sister. "I 
>n't want her out. If she ever got out, I 
ould fear for our lives, my husband and 
her people, too." 
"We just want her put away and to suf-
i'r for her whole life." added Michelle 
photos by Eli Lucero/Herald Journal 
Tamra Rhinehart, above left and in top right photo, appears in 1st District Court with her lawyer, Mary 
Corporon, on Friday in Logan. Rhinehart pleaded guilty to aggravated murder for conspiring with Craig 
Nicholls to kill her ex-husband, Michael Boudrero. In bottom right photo, Cache County Deputy Attorney 
o._„ wwafa .~„.„, «„„„ oininnhcrt'Q n i M anrp.Rment durina court. Sentencing is scheduled for April 28. 
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMRA RHINEHART, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 080102055 
Judge: Kevin K. Allen 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Relief In preparation for its decision, 
the Court has reviewed the Motion and Memorandum, the Opposition, the Reply, each document 
submitted before the Court, and the applicable case law and statutory provisions. In addition, oral 
arguments were received on March 31, 2010. Having considered the forgoing, the Court issues 
this Memorandum Decision. 
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel: 
Petitioner must satisfy a two-prong test in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "First, the defendant 
must show that counsel's performance was deficient.. . . Second, the defendant must show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. "Additionally, "proof of ineffective 
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality."" 
Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, <|36 (Utah 2009) (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 
(Utah 1993)). 
As to the first prong, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that her counsel's representation 
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, at 688. Although Petitioner 
argues that she was coerced into making the plea by her trial counsel and that her trial counsel 
1 
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mislead her about the sentence she should receive, the record does not support such contentions. 
Rather, the record demonstrates that Petitioner repeatedly affirmed that she had adequate 
opportunity to talk with her attorneys, that she was fully satisfied with her counsel's 
representation and advice received, and that she was not coerced or made promises in entering 
her plea. Petitioner also fully waived her right to have Attorney Scott Williams present. In 
addition, Mr. William's Affidavit acknowledges that the plea "was an appropriate resolution." 
Moreover, the newspaper picture that Petitioner has submitted does not support her allegation of 
coercion. Rather, the picture suggests concern and comfort by her trial counsel as Attorney Mary 
Corporon's fingers are lightly around Petitioner's shoulder instead of being "firmly" pressed on 
her shoulder. Therefore, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence that would 
objectively demonstrate that her counsel's representation was unreasonable. See generally State 
v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Coupled with Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the claim that her 
plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because she was mentally or emotionally 
unstable. However, this claim is also refuted by the plea colloquy. The court accepted 
Petitioner's plea only after specifically addressing Petitioner's use of Lexapro and her ability to 
understand the proceedings and consequences of entering her plea. Also, Petitioner represented to 
the Court that she did not have any mental or emotional problems or disabilities which would 
interfere with her ability to understand the proceedings. As such, Petitioner has failed to show 
that her plea was unknowing and involuntary or that her counsel was ineffective by failing to stop 
her from entering a knowing and voluntary plea. 
Additionally, the meticulous and thorough plea colloquy done by the court accepting 
Petitioner's plea, overcame any alleged deficiencies in Petitioner's trial counsel's representations 
regarding the rights given up and consequences of entering her plea. Based on the foregoing, the 
Court finds that the allegations in the Petition are insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Petitioner's trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. It is reasonable for trial counsel to advise a client to accept a plea offer sparing 
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them a possible death sentence. Nicholls, 2009 UT 12, ^ [3.7. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to 
satisfy the Strickland test. 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel: 
Petitioner argues that her appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise the issue of 
a misplea on appeal. Petitioner argues that her plea was flawed because "[s]he was under the 
influence of Lexapro, extremely emotional, and collapsed during the proceeding" and because 
she was not correctly informed of her rights. (Petition, 12). However, the record of the plea-
hearing evidences that her plea was not flawed. The court was aware that Petitioner was taking 
Lexapro. The court on more than one occasion addressed the effects Lexapro had on.Petitioner's 
ability to enter a blowing and voluntary plea. In all cases, Petitioner stated that the medication 
did not negatively affect her. More important, Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence that 
the Lexapro impaired her ability to enter her guilty plea. Oliver v. State, 2006 UT 60, \\ 1 (Utah 
2006) (holding that "[t]he critical question is whether the drugs - if they have a capacity to 
impair the defendant's ability to plea - have in fact done so on this occasion"). 
In most instances, . , . when a mood-altering drug is given to a defendant by a 
physician, it is to improve the defendant's cognitive abilities. In other words, the fact 
that a defendant has undergone a medical evaluation and is receiving medication to 
treat a psychological infirmity is often evidence weighing in favor of a finding that 
the defendant is capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea. 
Id. at [^14. It has also been established that a trial court need not, sua sponte, move for a 
competency hearing when a defendant is '"'coherent," "respond[s] to questions appropriately," 
and "repeatedly affirm[s]" [her] choice to plead gwlty".Nicholls9 2009 UT 12,1J29 (quoting State 
v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 53 (Utah 2003)). Also, Petitioner has failed to assert that the Rule 11 
plea colloquy was improper as was the case in State v. Lopez, 2005 UT App. 496, [^22 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2005). (holding that the jurisdictional time limit imposed on a motion to withdraw did not 
effect a court's ability to set aside a plea when the court finds that the plea was not knowingly 
and voluntarily made). Rather, the plea hearing record establishes that the court determined, more 
than once, that the Petitioner in fact was mentally capable of entering a plea and that such plea 
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was in fact knowingly, freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made. 
As such, it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for Petitioner's appellate counsel to 
"fail" to assert a "misplea" claim on direct appeal. Petitioner has failed to show that there was "a 
reasonable probability that, but for [her] counsel's unreasonable failure to file a merits brief, 
[s]he would have prevailed on [her] appeal." Kelly. State, 2008 UT 62, }^25 (Utah 2008) (quoting 
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286, 120 S. Ct. 746 (2000)). Therefore, Petitioner has failed to 
meet her burden under the Strickland test as to this claim. 
Conclusion: 
Petitioner has failed to carry her burden of proof on both of her grounds for relief raised 
in her Petition. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is granted. Counsel for Respondent is directed 
to prepare an order in conformance herewith. 
. Dated this ^ T ^ d a y of May, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
M e i T 
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